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The Origins of American Health Libertarianism
Lewis A. Grossman'
ABSTRACT:
This Article examines Americans' enduring demand for freedom of
therapeutic choice as a popular constitutional movement originating in the United
States' early years. In exploring extrajudicial advocacy for therapeutic choice
between the American Revolution and the Civil War, this piece illustrates how
multiple concepts of freedom in addition to bodily freedom bolstered the concept
of a constitutional right to medical liberty.
There is a deep current of belief in the United States that people have a right
to choose their preferred treatments without government interference. Modem
American history has given rise to movements for access to abortion, life-ending
drugs, unapproved cancer treatments, and medical marijuana. Recently, cries of
"Death Panels" have routinely been directed against health care reform proposals
that citizens believe would limit the products and procedures covered by
government health insurance. Some of the most prominent contemporary
struggles for health freedom have been waged in court. But other important
recent battles for freedom of therapeutic choice have taken place in other forums,
from legislative hearings to Food and Drug Administration advisory committee
meetings to public demonstrations.
This attitude of therapeutic libertarianism is not new. Drawing mainly on
primary historical sources, this Article examines arguments in favor of freedom
of therapeutic choice voiced in antebellum America in the context of battles
against state licensing regimes. After considering some anti-licensing arguments
made before independence, it discusses the views and statements of Benjamin
Rush, an influential founding father who was also the most prominent American
physician of the early national period. The Article then analyzes the Jacksonian-
era battle against medical licensing laws waged by the practitioners and
supporters of a school of botanical medicine known as Thomsonianism. This
triumphant struggle was waged in explicitly constitutional terms, even though it
occurred entirely outside of the courts. The Thomsonian campaign thus offers
one of the most striking examples of a successful popular constitutional
movement in American history. This article shows that, at its origin, the
American commitment to freedom of therapeutic choice was based on notions of
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not only bodily freedom, but also economic freedom, freedom of conscience, and
freedom of inquiry. Finally, this Article considers ways in which this early
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INTRODUCTION
An American editorialist, outraged by the government's intrusive meddling
in health care, angrily contended that restrictions on freedom of medical choice
were the product of an insidious conspiracy among elites both inside and outside
the government. He argued that state interference in the therapeutic choices of
citizens represented an unconstitutional violation of the people's most basic
rights. The writer ominously declared, "The ... duty demanded on a cargo of tea
in '76, was of small importance, but . .. the principle it involved . . . turned the
whole harbor of Boston into one . . . teapot." The writer warned the
"demagogues" in the legislature "to remember that the blood of that tea party still
lives and runs" in their constituents' veins. He sought the support of "every man
... who does not wish to be trampled in the dust and deprived of his
constitutional liberty."'
The column described above was not published in the twenty-first century,
but rather appeared in an 1838 issue of the Botanico-Medical Recorder, a journal
of alternative medicine. The author was almost certainly Alva Curtis, the leader
of a group of botanical practitioners known as the "Independent Thomsonians."2
Thomsonianism was a system of cure developed some thirty years earlier by a
New Hampshire farmer and itinerant healer named Samuel Thomson. Shortly
before writing this editorial, Curtis had engineered a factional split between his
"Independents" and less compromising devotees of Thomson's original system. 3
Despite this development, Curtis remained committed to the core aspects of
Thomsonian medicine.4 In this column, he directed his fury at the Ohio
Legislature's refusal to grant a charter to a medical school that he had recently
established in Columbus with a curriculum based on Thomsonian principles.
Curtis' rhetoric exemplifies an extraordinarily successful Thomsonian-led
movement for medical freedom in antebellum America. The primary aim of this
1 Editorial, 6 BOTANICO-MEDICAL RECORDER 24, Aug. 25, 1838, at 376. Alva Curtis served as
both the editor and publisher of the Botanico-Medical Recorder, which until October 1937 was
known as the Thomsonian Recorder. See also the newspaper excerpt-in a journal otherwise
completely dedicated to botanical medicine-describing a visit to New York City by the last living
participant in the Boston Tea Party. The Only Survivor of the Boston Tea Party, 3 THOMSONIAN
RECORDER 368, 368 (1835).
2 See Alex Berman, Neo-Thomsonianism in the United States, Il J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sc.
133, 138 (1956).
3 Id. at 134; JOHN S HALLER JR., THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS: SAMUEL THOMSON AND THE
AMERICAN BOTANICAL MOVEMENT 1790-1860, at 98-99 (2000).
4 Berman, supra note 2, at 134.
5 A bill awarding the charter had died in December 1837 after the chairman of the relevant
committee in the Ohio Senate-an orthodox doctor-had reported against it. Curtis' lobbying and
public advocacy ultimately succeeded, however, and on March 6, 1839, the state legislature
overwhelmingly passed a bill chartering the Botanico-Medical College of Ohio. HALLER, THE
PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 98-99.
79
4
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 13 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol13/iss1/2
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
movement was the repeal of state medical licensing laws. According to the
Thomsonians, these statutes represented an effort by the orthodox (or "regular")
medical profession to obtain a monopoly on the practice of medicine by
effectively outlawing botanical and other alternative practice. In 1833, five years
before the appearance of the editorial, medical freedom advocates had managed
to erase a licensing requirement from Ohio's statute books.6 Curtis viewed the
denial of the medical school charter as a revival of the plot to violate the freedom
of unorthodox practitioners and their patients. These Ohio battles were just one
front in a nationwide war for medical freedom waged by the Thomsonians and
their supporters. Their overwhelming victory is reflected in the fact that between
1830 and the Civil War, the United States was transformed from a country that
almost universally embraced some form of medical licensing to one in which this
type of regulation was virtually nonexistent.
While this Article focuses on health libertarianism in the period between the
American Revolution and the Civil War, my broader project seeks to demonstrate
that struggles for freedom of therapeutic choice have recurred throughout
American history. During the late nineteenth century, a second wave of medical
licensing statutes provoked another outpouring of medical freedom-of-choice
literature, written largely by drugless practitioners (such as mind-curers,
Christian Scientists, and osteopaths) and their allies.7 Unlike the antebellum
medical licensing laws, these later statutes survived, buoyed by the Progressive
Era's embrace of the value of professional expertise. Nevertheless, the popular
demand for freedom of therapeutic choice ensured that these laws were drafted,
revised, interpreted, and enforced in a way that allowed alternative healers to
continue to practice largely unimpeded.8 Beginning around the turn of the
twentieth century, popular movements also developed to resist more aggressive
impositions of "state medicine," such as mandatory vaccination laws and the
proposed establishment of a National Department of Health, which was thought
likely to be dominated by the orthodox medical establishment.9
Movements for freedom of therapeutic choice were largely-though not
completely-dormant between the 1930s and the 1960s, a period characterized
6 WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: FROM SECTS
TO SCIENCE 75-76, 145-46 (1992).
7 See, e.g., Benjamin Orange Flower, Restrictive Medical Legislation and the Public Weal, 19
ARENA 781, 808 (1898); Clifford P. Smith, Christian Science and Legislation, 23 CHRISTIAN SCL. J.
407 (1905); Alexander Wilder, Medical Liberty, 2 MIND 193, 194-95 (1898). See generally Lewis
A. Grossman, You Can Choose Your Medicine: Freedom of Therapeutic Choice in American Law
and History (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (providing a complete examination of
the struggle over medical licensing through the mid-1910s).
8 Id.
9 See MICHAEL WILLRICH, Pox: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2011); Stephen Petrina, Medical
Liberty: Drugless Healers Confront Allopathic Doctors, 1910-1931, 29 J. OF MED. HUMAN. 205
(2008); Manfred Waserman, The Quest for a National Health Department in the Progressive Era,
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by an anomalously high level of popular confidence in American governmental,
scientific, and medical institutions.'o Since the 1970s, however, such movements
have reemerged in force, focusing on access to particular products and
procedures. In contrast to the earlier extrajudicial medical freedom movements,
many of the most prominent modern fights over freedom of medical choice have
been waged in court. Most famously, in Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme
Court held that the constitutional right to privacy includes a time-limited right to
obtain an abortion." Since then, the Supreme Court has also wrestled with issues
concerning access to alternative medicines,12 life-ending drugs,' 3 and medical
marijuana.' 4 Moreover, in a widely followed 2007 case, the United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, held that terminally ill patients
do not have a substantive due process right to purchase drugs not approved by the
FDA.'"
Legal scholars have devoted an enormous amount of attention to these cases
adjudicating the limits of medical freedom. But focusing exclusively on modem
judicial decisions provides a misleading portrait of the struggle for medical
freedom in the United States. This court-centered approach implies that
constitutional arguments for freedom of therapeutic choice are only as old as
modern privacy jurisprudence and that courts are the exclusive forum for
10 See John C. Burnham, American Medicine's Golden Age: What Happened to It?, 215 Sd.
1474 (1982); Allan Mazur, Commentary: Opinion Poll Measurement ofAmerican Confidence in
Science, 6 Sci., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 16 (1981).
11 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (holding that the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act neither expressly nor impliedly provides an exemption to the new drug approval
requirements for terminally ill patients). Earlier in this litigation, the United States District Court
held that the FDA had infringed cancer patients' constitutionally protected privacy interests by
denying them access to Laetrile, the drug at issue. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287,
1298-1301 (W.D. Okla. 1977). This constitutional question was not on review at the Supreme
Court, and on remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's conclusion that the FDA
had violated the patients' constitutional right to privacy. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455
(10th Cir. 1980).
13 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (rejecting substantive due process right to
assisted suicide); cf Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (confirming
substantive due process right of competent individuals to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but
permitting procedural safeguards to ensure that decision by incompetent patient's surrogates
reflects patient's wishes).
14 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (denying the
existence of a medical necessity exception to the federal Controlled Substances Act that would
permit marijuana used for medical purposes); cf Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (ruling that
under the Commerce Clause, the federal government could constitutionally enforce the Controlled
Substances Act with respect to homegrown marijuana cultivated for personal medical purposes).
15 Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), 495 F.3d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert denied, 552 U.S. 1159 (2008). This en banc decision vacated an earlier
ruling in which a D.C. Circuit panel voted, 2-1, that terminally ill patients do, under certain
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constitutional struggles of this type. Focusing only on judicial opinions may also
suggest that American demands for medical freedom are typically based solely
on notions of bodily liberty and integrity. This Article's exploration of the
extrajudicial history of American health libertarianism in the country's first
century is intended to challenge these assumptions.
By reviewing the robust early arguments for medical freedom in the United
States, I will establish that such advocacy has deep roots, predating any
substantial treatment in the Supreme Court jurisprudence. I will also show how
during the antebellum period, struggles for freedom of therapeutic choice were
waged on explicitly constitutional grounds, even though they occurred almost
entirely outside of court. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that in the country's
early years, advocates of medical freedom grounded their claims not only in the
now dominant arguments for bodily freedom, but also in assertions of economic
freedom, freedom of inquiry, and freedom of conscience and religion.
I begin, in Part I of this Article, by providing the background information
necessary to understand early American health libertarianism. Section L.A
presents a preliminary introduction to the concept of popular constitutionalism
and lays the foundation for exploring how antebellum medical freedom advocates
exemplified this phenomenon. Section I.B then offers a brief introduction to both
orthodox and unorthodox medical practice in the nation's early years. In Part II, I
proceed to examine American health libertarianism in the period prior to 1820.
Section II.A describes the rise of medical licensing during the nation's first
decades-a development that forms the backdrop for the medical freedom
arguments explored in the remainder of the Article. Section II.B then examines
some of the earliest examples of American anti-licensing rhetoric. Section II.C
discusses Benjamin Rush who, though probably the most prominent orthodox
physician of the early national period, advanced fairly detailed arguments for
medical freedom. Section II.D goes on to consider Rush's legacy to later
advocates for freedom of therapeutic choice.
In Part III of the Article, I explore the period between 1820 and the Civil
War, during which the battle against medical licensing became a popular
constitutionalist movement led by the Thomsonians. Section III.A begins by
describing the success of this struggle, as illustrated by the virtual disappearance
of medical practice acts from the American legal landscape. Section III.B then
offers important information about the Thomsonian movement itself. Section
III.C situates the Thomsonians in the broader context of Jacksonian Democracy,
the dominant political culture of the 1830s and 1840s. Section III.D goes on to
demonstrate that the victorious antebellum fight against medical licensing was
waged on explicitly constitutional terms, even though it occurred completely
outside the courts. Section III.E analyzes the different strands of freedom rhetoric
contained in the Thomsonian literature, including not only bodily freedom, but
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religion. Finally, Section I1I.F offers a detailed description of the anti-licensing
campaign in New York to provide a concrete example of how the Thomsonians
succeeded in erasing most medical practice acts from the country's statute books.
I conclude the Article by briefly considering how this historical perspective can
help us understand modem extrajudicial activism for medical freedom as part of
a multidimensional popular constitutional movement.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Popular Constitutionalism
The story of the successful antebellum fight against medical licensing
depicted in this Article supports the thesis that during this country's first seventy
years or so, medical freedom advocates shaped certain aspects of constitutional
meaning entirely outside the courts. This Article thus contributes to the literature
on "popular constitutionalism."
Although the term "popular constitutionalism" appeared in the law review
literature as early as 1984,16 it emerged as a common label for a branch of
constitutional studies in the late 1990s. In 1999, Douglas S. Reed, limning what
he called a "theory of popular constitutionalism," drew on the work of a group of
scholars who were "trying, in many different ways, to provide a theory of
extrajudicial legal interpretation and mobilization." 7 One of the authors he
discussed was Mark Tushnet, who earlier that year had published Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts, which would prove to be one of the seminal
works of popular constitutionalist scholarship. 8 Tushnet's book distinguished
between the "thick Constitution" and the "thin Constitution."' 9 According to
Tushnet, the former consists of the many detailed provisions of the U.S.
Constitution setting forth and regulating the organization of the federal
government. These provisions are rarely the source of widespread or impassioned
public debate. The "thin Constitution," by contrast, consists of the fundamental
principles of equality and liberty stated in the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution's preamble. Although the "thin Constitution" is reflected in the
U.S. Constitution's specific rights-guaranteeing provisions, it is not identical to
these provisions or what the Supreme Court has said about them. Rather, its
meaning is contested and shaped by the people themselves in public, often
political, venues outside the courts. Tushnet dubbed this model, which he
16 Ronald K. L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyond the "New
Federalism ", 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi, xi, xii, xxiii (1984).
17 Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State Constitutional
Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L. J. 871, 877 (1999).
18 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
19 Id. at 9-14.
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presented as more aspirational than descriptive, "populist constitutionalism." 20
Tushnet's "populist constitutionalism" and Reed's "popular
constitutionalism" were closely related concepts. 2 1 For whatever reason, the latter
term captured the field. Since the turn of the century, "popular constitutionalism"
has been a standard classification for the work of a diverse assortment of
scholars, including Tushnet himself, who embrace the notion that the people,
rather than judges, are the ultimate constitutional authority. 22 While some of
these scholars, like Tushnet, take a primarily normative approach, others claim
that popular constitutionalism is not only an ideal to strive for, but also is an
accurate account of constitutional practice for much of U.S. history. Larry
Kramer, for example, has asserted that popular constitutionalism thoroughly
dominated American constitutional understanding in the country's early years
and remained an important strain of American constitutionalism until the 1980s,
when judicial supremacy became a shared ideal across the political spectrum. 23
The literature on popular constitutionalism emphasizes arenas outside the
courts in which citizens have fought to shape constitutional meaning. Kramer, for
example, describes various "extrajudicial" forums for popular constitutional
lawmaking in U.S. history, including mobs, boycotts, rallies, petition drives,
elections, and jury service. 2 4 This is not to say that all scholars of popular
constitutionalism exclude courts from the scope of institutions subject to
influence by social movements.25 In fact, popular constitutionalists express a
wide range of views regarding the optimal and actual function of the courts in
constitutional interpretation. 2 6 But they all share a conviction that the
20 See generally id.
21 The differences between Tushnet's "populist constitutionalism" and Reed's "popular
constitutionalism" are rather vague. See Reed, supra note 17, at 879 n.14. Reed points out that they
coined their terms simultaneously and independently. Id.
22 Some prominent examples of this growing body of literature include LARRY D. KRAMER,
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); Larry
Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1594 (2005);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law
in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1323 (2006). See also A Symposium on The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism
and Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809-1182 (2006).
23 KRAMER, supra note 22.
24 Id.
25 Reva Siegel, for example, has shown how the popular mobilization both supporting and
opposing the unsuccessful Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s shaped judges' understanding of
the constitutional doctrine of equal protection in a way that ultimately forged a "de facto"
amendment reflected in court doctrine. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323
(2006).
26 James E. Fleming offers a typology dividing popular constitutionalism into five versions
based primarily on their adherents' attitudes toward judicial review and judicial supremacy. James
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construction of constitutional meaning cannot be fully understood through an
exclusive focus on judges.27
The early nineteenth-century battle over medical licensing is an excellent
example of American popular constitutionalism in action.28 Furthermore, it offers
an ideal opportunity to examine popular constitutionalism in an extrajudicial
context, for courts simply did not play a part in the drama. Indeed, antebellum
foes of medical licensing appear not to have even sought judicial review. As will
be shown below, in Part III, they pursued their struggle, and achieved their
victories, entirely through popular mobilization outside the courts.
B. Orthodox Medicine and Its Alternatives
The medical freedom rhetoric examined by this Article cannot be fully
comprehended without some background information on orthodox medicine in
the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.
Early American orthodox medicine was based almost completely on
speculative deduction from the principle that good health was a balance of
systemic forces in the body. From this perspective, illness was an imbalance
characterized by excessive excitement or enfeeblement. "The fundamental
Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1379-80 (2005).
27 Fleming, with questionable justification, counts among the ranks of popular
constitutionalists "departmentalists who are not populists"-scholars who focus on the role of
legislatures and executives, alongside courts, in determining constitutional construction but who do
not emphasize the role of citizens generally. Id. at 1379. Robert Post and Reva Siegel warn against
such a fusion of departmentalism and popular constitutionalism, observing, "Most theorists of
departmentalism situate their analysis in the context of separation of powers, rather than popular
constitutionalism." Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (2004).
28 Theodore W. Ruger makes points somewhat similar to mine in Plural Constitutionalism
and the Pathologies ofAmerican Health Care, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 347 (2011), which includes a
short discussion of the antebellum anti-licensing campaign. Id. at 354-56. In framing his argument
regarding the existence of a "noncanonical" constitution that "prioritizes individual therapeutic
choice," id. at 348, 356, Ruger draws heavily on the framework of "large C" Constitutionalism
versus "small c" constitutionalism set forth in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES (2010). In this formulation, "large C" Constitutionalism is based on the
formal text of the Constitution and Supreme Court decisions interpreting this text, whereas "small
c" constitutionalism is rooted in foundational commitments expressed through political activity and
popular social movements. Id. at 1-24. As Eskridge and Ferejohn themselves remark, a parallel
exists between their categories and Tushnet's "thick Constitution" and "thin Constitution,"
respectively. Id. at 60. My chief disagreement with Ruger is that he characterizes the antebellum
arguments against medical licensing as being primarily "large C" ones, whereas in this Article I
will show that "thin constitutional" arguments (parallel to "small c" arguments) were prevalent, and
probably dominant, in the anti-licensing literature of the time. Ruger, Plural Constitutionalism,
supra, at 354. 1 also find Tushnet's framework more apt than Eskridge and Ferejohn's for this
particular topic, for although they criticize Tushnet for his apparent exclusion of courts from the
interpretation of the "thin ["small c"] Constitution," the courts did, in fact, remain on the sidelines
of the antebellum medical licensing controversy.
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objective was to restore the natural balance, which was accomplished by
depleting or lowering the overexcited patient and by stimulating or elevating the
patient enfeebled by disease." 2 9 In the first decades of the nineteenth century,
most regular doctors believed that most diseases were overstimulating, rather
than enfeebling. The typical treatments used to restore the natural balance were
thus depletive ones.30 Mainstream doctors routinely enervated their patients
through the use of therapies such as bleeding; the administration of massive
doses of mineral-based purgatives, emetics, and diaphoretics; 31 and the
application of blistering plasters to the skin. The two main symbols of this
approach to medicine-among both its proponents and critics-were the lancet
(an instrument used for bleeding) and calomel (a mercury-based purgative).
Later observers labeled this approach to healing "heroic" medicine because
of the regular practitioners' commitment to aggressive, interventionist treatment.
As stated by a leading medical historian, "[D]uring the first two-thirds of the
nineteenth century . . . the physician's 'redemptive role,' his active therapeutic
intervention in an effort to redeem patients from disease, was at the core of what
it meant to be a physician in America." 32 The most famous-or, in the eyes of
critics, infamous-episode of heroic medicine's reign occurred at the 1799
deathbed of George Washington, who was suffering from a severe throat
infection. Physicians treating the stoic national hero dosed him with a purgative
and emetic, applied blisters to his throat and legs, and drained about half of the
blood from his body.
Despite the frequent use of a single term, "heroic medicine," to describe
early American orthodox practice, disagreements sometimes arose among
orthodox doctors with regard to both principles and remedies. 34 The United
States' most renowned and influential practitioner of depletive heroic medicine
was Dr. Benjamin Rush, discussed in detail below.35 In the 1790s, Rush was
challenged by some other regular doctors who asserted that stimulative as well as
29 JOHN HARLEY WARNER, THE THERAPEUTIC PERSPECTIVE: MEDICAL PRACTICE, KNOWLEDGE,
AND IDENTITY IN AMERICA, 1820-1885, 85 (1986). Conventional medicine was later termed
"allopathic" medicine by its homeopathic opponents, because it used drugs and remedies intended
to produce effects opposite the symptoms being treated. JAMES C. WHORTON, NATURE CURES: THE
HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE IN AMERICA 18 (2004). In Greek, allo means opposite, and
pathos means suffering.
30 WARNER, supra note 29, at 91.
31 These words are used to designate substances that induce bowel evacuation, vomiting, and
sweating, respectively.
32 See WARNER, supra note 29, at 11.
33 RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 807-09 (2010); JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 531-35 (1839). The purgative and emetic used were calomel and antimony
potassium tartrate ("tartar emetic"), respectively.
34 BENJAMIN RUSH, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN RUSH: His "TRAVELS THROUGH LIFE"
TOGETHER WITH HIS COMMONPLACE BOOK FOR 1789-1813, at 361-66 app. I ("Rush's Medical
Theories") (G. W. Corner ed., 1970).




Grossman: The Origins of American Health Libertarianism
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN HEALTH LIBERTARIANISM
depletive remedies had a useful role in treatment.36 His opponents' view
reemerged in force in the middle of the nineteenth century, as orthodox
practitioners increasingly prescribed stimulative therapies such as quinine (from
cinchona bark), iron compounds, and alcohol.37 Furthermore, around that time,
growing numbers of regular doctors began to articulate an attitude of therapeutic
skepticism, suggesting that physicians should merely provide palliative care
while letting nature take its course.3 8 Such trends, however, should not be
overstated. Although bleeding largely disappeared, other depletive therapies were
used-though often in smaller doses-throughout the century.39 And even those
orthodox practitioners who embraced the rhetoric of skepticism remained
committed to pharmaceutical intervention in practice.40
Who were these "regular" doctors? The borders defining the orthodox
medical profession were quite indistinct in early American history. Regular
physicians were likely to be members of local and state medical societies, and
they increasingly also tended to be graduates of foreign or domestic medical
schools. Yet neither of these credentials was a precondition for practice before
the Civil War.41 As discussed in detail below, 4 2 orthodox medical practitioners
sought to secure the boundaries of their profession by encouraging the passage of
state medical licensing requirements. The details of these laws varied greatly, but
even the strictest of them posed relatively low barriers to entry. As Paul Starr
observes, "The preferred statuses-medical school graduate, society member,
licensed practitioner-were continually invaded by the lower ranks of the
profession as schools multiplied, societies became less exclusive, and licenses
became easier to acquire." 4 3
The blurriness of the line dividing regular and irregular medicine does not,
however, negate the fact that many practitioners were clearly outside the
fraternity of regular physicians. The antebellum medical landscape was populated
36 RUSH, supra note 34, at 361-66 app. I ("Rush's Medical Theories").
37 See WARNER, supra note 29, at 98.
38 Id. at 135, 240-41, 267-68.
39 Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Sociocultural Impact of Twentieth-Century Therapeutics, in
THERAPEUTIC REVOLUTION: ESSAYS IN THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 245, 247
(Morris J. Vogel & Charles E. Rosenberg eds., 1979).
40 Charles E. Rosenberg, The Therapeutic Revolution: Medicine, Meaning, and Social
Change in Nineteenth-Century America, in THERAPEUTIC REVOLUTION: ESSAYS IN THE SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 3, 19-21 (Morris J. Vogel & Charles E. Rosenberg eds., 1979);
WARNER, supra note 29, at 29-31, 36.
41 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 63-72, 87-100.
42 See infra Section II.A.
43 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A
SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 46 (1984). The boundaries defining
the orthodox armamentarium were somewhat permeable, as well. A few important remedies used
by regular physicians, such as inoculation for smallpox and powdered cinchona bark (the source of
quinine) for malaria, originated in folk medicine, and popular healers borrowed some remedies
from orthodox medicine. Id. at 47.
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by large numbers of indisputably lay practitioners, including botanical healers,
midwives, bonesetters, unschooled inoculators, and abortionists.44 In some
instances, one's status as an "irregular" doctor was dictated by race or gender.
Native Americans, African Americans, and women were virtually excluded from
the orthodox medical profession, but they were extremely well represented
among the ranks of lay and folk healers.45 Indeed, women members of
households were the nation's most important primary health care providers.
Informed by oral tradition, by personal experience, and, increasingly, by
published manuals on domestic medicine, many housewives were experts at the
use of botanical and other household remedies.46
As the nineteenth century progressed, increasing numbers of alternative
practitioners-including white men who might have been eligible to practice
regular medicine-began to join organized groups that rejected orthodox medical
practices and theories in favor of other healing systems. By the end of the
nineteenth century, these irregular "schools" of medicine included eclectic
medicine, homeopathy, Christian Science, and osteopathy, among many others.
Because of this Article's focus on the antebellum years, the only alternative
school that it will examine closely is Thomsonianism. This botanical medical sect
was founded in the 1810s and thrived into the 1840s. It was the first significant
organized alternative medicine group in the United States and was, by far, the
most important of its time. 4 7 The Thomsonians were not merely adherents of a
particular system of medicine; as the leaders of a nationwide fight against state
medical licensing laws, they were also the core members of a popular
constitutionalist movement for medical freedom. As the next section will show,
however, the Thomsonians did not invent American health libertarianism.
Examples of this attitude can be found in the nation's earliest years. It arose in
response to the first attempts to establish medical licensing regimes, in the
eighteenth century.
II. AMERICAN HEALTH LIBERTARIANISM PRE-1820
A. The Rise ofMedical Licensing
Even prior to the Revolutionary War, orthodox physicians in America
sporadically attempted to persuade colonial governments to pass laws mandating
the examination and licensure of doctors. Their primary stated aim was to protect
44 Id. at 48.
45 Id. at 47-51.
46 Id. at 32-37; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 32-34.
47 See CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS 70 (1962) (explaining that the followers
of Thomsonianism were the "most numerous and vocal" of the irregular medical groups);
WHORTON, supra note 29, at 25 (asserting that Samuel Thomson was the "first into the field" of
alternative medical movements).
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the vulnerable and ignorant public from "quacks" and "mountebanks."4 8 They
also bemoaned the disrepute that untrained and unorthodox practitioners brought
down on the entire profession. "It is very injurious to regular-bred physicians,"
one licensing advocate remarked, "that such impostors are suffered to deceive
mankind and bring into contempt the honorable profession of physic." 49
These efforts to create licensing regimes were generally unsuccessful,50 and
those few licensing laws that passed were primarily honorific measures that did
not penalize practice by unlicensed physicians.s' Prior to the middle of the
eighteenth century, efforts to institute medical licensing almost invariably
encountered opposition or indifference among the majority of citizens,
suggesting the deep-rootedness of the American preference for freedom of
therapeutic choice. In the words of medical historian Richard Harrison Shryock,
"Most men seem to have believed that a people who entrusted their souls to all
sorts of preachers, could likewise entrust their bodies to all sorts of 'doctors."' 52
The strongest colonial licensing laws, at least on paper, were those enacted
by New York in 1760 and by New Jersey in 1772. These statutes required that
doctors be examined and licensed by lay officials and imposed fines on violators.
The fate of these two laws, however, illustrates how (consistent with the
approach of popular constitutionalism) it is often necessary to look beyond
formal legal sources to determine citizens' attitudes towards medical liberty. The
New York and New Jersey laws were extremely unpopular and thus barely
enforced, if at all. 5 3 In discussing these statutes (as well as the colonial-era
measures that failed to pass) one scholar has observed, "many people resisted
licensure essentially because of the threat it posed to their traditional freedom to
choose from among a broad range of healers."54
On the eve of the Revolution, no effective constraint on practice by
unorthodox and untrained doctors existed in the American colonies. One
commentator facetiously remarked in 1774, "There is no law for hanging
mountebanks, that I know of, in this land of liberty; and therefore they that are
48 See, e.g., Anon., The Correspondent, No. XIV, CONN. J., Mar. 19, 1773, at 1.
49 Anon., Untitled, NEW-LONDON GAZETTE, Oct. 8, 1773, at 1.
50 For example, in 1767, the regular physicians of Litchfield County, Connecticut, organized
themselves into a society that would examine and certify candidates, but the society's effort to
persuade the colonial legislature to formalize its status went nowhere. RICHARD HARRISON
SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING IN AMERICA, 1650-1965, at 18 (1967); Resolves of the Medical
Corporation ofLitchfield County, CONN. COURANT, Feb. 23, 1767, at 1.
51 STARR, supra note 43, at 44. It was not, however, unheard of for courts to levy penalties.
For example, in 1672, the Suffolk County Court fined a man for practicing medicine without its
approval, as required at the time by Massachusetts law. SHRYOCK, supra note 50, at 14.
52 SHRYOCK, supra note 50, at 15.
53 Id. at 17; STARR, supra note 43, at 44.
54 JAMES H. CASSEDY, MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 19 (1991). For discussions
of the occasional gestures toward medical licensing in the American colonies, see id. at 18-19;
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 37-38; SHRYOCK, supra note 50, at 13-19.
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fond of them may . . . run after them as long as they please."s The same year, a
committee of Connecticut doctors complained:
[T]he power of the magistrate is very seldom or ever exerted, or
any Notice taken in this country for the preservation of health, or
distinguishing the eminent, the learned, from the illiterate and
the ignorant. . . . The importance of a proper medical police is
either not understood or very little attended to or regarded. 6
After the signing of the Declaration of Independence, states gradually began
to enact medical licensing laws in response to pressure from the growing body of
regularly educated physicians.57 By 1800, six states had medical practice acts of
some kind on the books. The 1810s saw the multiplication and strengthening of
state licensing regimes-a trend that peaked with a flurry of legislative activity in
the late 1810s and early 1820s. The statutes of this period generally required
examination and licensing by state medical societies-societies that were, in
many instances, incorporated by the same laws.58 By the end of 1825, eighteen of
the twenty-four extant states, plus the District of Columbia, had adopted medical
licensing.59
The nature and severity of the sanctions set forth in these licensing statutes
varied significantly from state to state and also changed within states as the laws
were amended. Some states' medical practice laws established no penalty
whatsoever for violators, and other states imposed fines too small to influence
behavior.6 0 In other jurisdictions, the sole sanction was a prohibition against
unlicensed practitioners bringing suits for unpaid fees.6 1 On the other side of the
scale, about half of the states that enacted medical licensing laws during this era
authorized the imposition of fines, and a few went so far as to allow the
imprisonment of violators.62 Despite the variation, overall, there was a trend
toward stricter penalties until the mid-i 820s.
55 Anon., Untitled Letter, ESSEx GAZETE, Mar. 15, 1774, at 129.
56 Anon., Untitled, NEW-LONDON GAZETTE, Apr. 15, 1774, at 4.
57 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 74.
58 Id.; SHRYOCK, supra note 50, at 23. In some states, candidates could qualify for a license by
passing examinations in medical school rather than the examination administered by the state
medical society. Id. at 25-27.
59 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 332-39 app. 11. The states still without medical licensing
systems in 1825 were Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia.
Tennessee enacted medical licensing in 1830 and North Carolina did so in 1859. The other four
states enacted no licensing legislation before the Civil War.
60 Id at 76.
61 Unlicensed practitioners could circumvent such provisions by simply demanding payment
before providing treatment. See STARR, supra note 43, at 44-45. In any event, even licensed
practitioners had trouble collecting unpaid fees in the courts. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 76.
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Nevertheless, this spread and toughening of medical licensing statutes does
not necessarily evince widespread support among the population for such
measures. One must assess a citizenry's embrace of a legal regime not only by
the law in the books, but also by the extent to which that law is actually put into
practice. Concededly, in New York-which, for a time, provided for
imprisonment of unlicensed practitioners-the medical practice statute was
"remarkably effective."6 But it appears that the licensing statutes in some other
states were utterly ineffective in limiting the number of practitioners. For
example, in 1811, the Maryland licensing examination committee grumbled that
it was simply unable to bring violators of that state's medical practice act to
justice." In some jurisdictions, especially frontier states with sparse populations
and small numbers of orthodox physicians, the antebellum licensing regimes
failed due to half-hearted implementation and a lack of enforcement by
government officials.65 Moreover, juries routinely refused to convict unlicensed
practitioners. 66 This jury conduct, in particular, suggests a widespread embrace of
the notion of freedom of therapeutic choice-a notion that many jurors likely had
never expressed, even to themselves, until they first encountered an actual
instance of state intrusion into the medical sphere.
The steady proliferation and strengthening of state licensing statutes between
the 1790s and early 1820s may have been due more to organizational than to
ideological factors. During the early national period, regular physicians
established many stable local and state medical societies,67 while irregular
doctors could point only to the network of small, local "Friendly Botanic
Societies" that Thomson began to build around 1811.68 This comparative lack of
organizational structure-along with the relatively low literacy of many medical
licensing opponents-may also help explain the dearth of a noteworthy body of
American medical freedom literature prior to the emergence of significant
Thomsonian societies and publications in the 1820s and 1830s. This scarcity of
early anti-licensing literature makes it difficult to assess the precise basis-
beyond economic self-interest-for the opposition to licensing by alternative
practitioners and their supporters during the country's first few decades. There
are, however, scattered clues.
63 Id. at 75. According to one publication of the time, "many" botanical practitioners were
imprisoned "for fifty or sixty days" in New York State. Anon., Untitled, I BOTANIC WATCHMAN 4,
Jan. 1, 1834, at 5.
64 Rothstein, supra note 6, at 77.
65 Id. at 75-76.
66 Id. at 76.
67 Id. at 327-31 app. 1.
68 HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 35-36.
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B. Early Arguments Against Medical Licensing
The meager record indicates that those who opposed medical licensing in the
late eighteenth century did so for various reasons that would persist throughout
the antebellum period examined in this Article. One theme that emerges from
early anti-licensing statements is the threat to economic freedom posed by
government-granted monopolies. For example, in 1769, an opponent of medical
licensing in Connecticut raised the specter of a doctors' monopoly exacting
excessive fees from the people. He contended, "[A] combination of Doctors
perhaps gives them a greater advantage to impose on mankind, by extravagant
demands, than if no such combination had been formed."6  Importantly, foes of
medical licensing seemed to fear that an orthodox doctors' monopoly would
threaten their freedom as well as their pocketbooks. When the Connecticut
legislature in 1787 considered, and rejected, a bill that would have established a
state medical society with licensing power, one representative protested that he
"did not like this plan: . . . it was a combination of the doctors: . . . they cost more
than they do good: this society ... was directly against liberty: they might shut
out every body else: it was a very dangerous thing."70
Opposition to monopolies was widespread in Revolutionary America.
Indeed, the American colonists' antagonism toward English grants of trade
monopolies, such as the East India Company's monopoly over tea importation to
the colonies, was a significant impetus for their bid for independence. 7 ' As
reflected in the Connecticut legislator's remarks quoted above, many Americans
of this period, drawing on a long tradition of anti-monopolism in English
jurisprudence and political thought, viewed exclusive charters as not only
detrimental to society's economic interests, but also as a violation of individuals'
economic rights. 72 Indeed, Thomas Jefferson, as well as six state ratifying
conventions, sought to include an anti-monopoly provision in the Bill of Rights
of the United States Constitution.
A related reason for the early opposition to medical licensing was suspicion
of the motives of the exclusive medical societies that would administer these
69 Anon., Untitled, CONN. COURANT, Jul. 31, 1769, at 5.
70 State of Connecticut, In the House of Representatives, May 24, CONN. J., June 6, 1787, at 3.
On the defeat of this measure, see ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 68.
71 Steven G. Calebresi & Larissa Price, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony
Capitalism 27-28 (Northwestern Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper
No. 12-20, 2012), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2130043.
72 Id. at 7-22. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610), an English case with an opinion
by Sir Edward Coke, was frequently cited by American colonists to support their assertion that
common law rights could abrogate Parliamentary Acts. Notably, the decision itself nullified a royal
charter (confirmed and amended by statute) that gave the College of Physicians the authority
(among other powers) to fine doctors for practicing without a license. See Theodore F.T. Plunckett,
Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARv. L. REV. 30 (1926).
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schemes. At the end of the eighteenth century, Americans exhibited widespread
"concern with the deceit and dissembling of sophisticated elites."74 They saw
"designs within designs, cabals within cabals."7 ' Any group or gathering
perceived to have aristocratic pretensions was viewed not only as unrepublican,
but also a conspiratorial threat to liberty. Thus another Connecticut legislator
opposed to the creation of a state medical society with licensing power opined
"[t]hat he was against all societies, whose constitutions & designs we did not
know; such as [the Society of the Cincinnati], free-masons, and this medical
society; that they were composed of cunning men, and we know not what
mischief they may be upon."7 7
Another premise in the sparse early record that would become an enduring
theme in American medical freedom literature was the importance of freedom of
inquiry. For example, in 1788 a Philadelphia newspaper observed that, although
the state legislature could address the problem of incompetent and ignorant
practitioners through legislation, "it has never yet interfered, not only from an
unwillingness to multiply restraint in a free country, but perhaps from a doubt,
whether some equivalent advantage might not arise from the liberty of attempting
medical experiments."7 This statement suggests that foes of medical licensing
thought that such laws not only constituted excessive state interference into
citizens' private affairs, but also threatened the progress of medical science by
hindering free inquiry. The writer of this column further explained: "Unfortunate
individuals suffer in the course of [the uneducated practitioner's] inquiries, but
the community at large is sometimes benefitted by an accession to experimental
knowledge."79
These two themes-first, the aversion to monopolies and elite fraternities
that undermined economic freedom and republican values, and second, the need
for free inquiry to advance medical knowledge-would dominate the medical
freedom rhetoric of Dr. Benjamin Rush. Paradoxically, although Rush was
perhaps the most prominent orthodox physician of the early national period, he
was also that era's most articulate opponent of licensing and proponent of
therapeutic choice.
74 GORDON S. WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED
STATES 104 (2011).
75 Id. at 88.
76 See id. at 81-126. On anti-aristocratic sentiments in the Revolutionary generation, see
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 240-43 (1992).
77 State of Connecticut, In the House of Representatives, May 24, CONNECTICUT JOURNAL,
June 6, 1787, at 2-3. The Society of the Cincinnati was a hereditary fraternal order of army
officers, of whom George Washington was the first president. The society was widely scorned as a
secretive, elitist, aristocratic institution, and in 1787, George Washington tried, with mixed success,
to force reforms on it, including abandonment of its hereditary character. See CHERNOW, supra note
33, at 497-500.
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C. Benjamin Rush: Orthodox Advocate for Medical Liberty
Philadelphia's Benjamin Rush (1746-1813), although less celebrated than
some of his fellow Founding Fathers, was an influential figure during the birth of
the nation and an extraordinary Renaissance man almost on the level of Franklin
and Jefferson. He was not only an extremely prominent physician and a medical
professor at the University of Pennsylvania, but also a member of the Continental
Congress, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a member of the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, an antislavery pamphleteer, a longtime
Treasurer of the U.S. Mint, and the founder of Dickinson College.s0 Most
crucially for the purposes of this inquiry, Rush was also the first well-known
American opponent of medical licensing and advocate for medical freedom.
One might assume that Rush, as the nation's leading orthodox doctor, would
have sided with the forces of exclusion and privilege. In fact, during the
Revolutionary years, Rush was a staunch Federalist, apprehensive about extreme
democracy and hostile to Pennsylvania's radicals. By 1789, however, he had
undergone a dramatic conversion, and for the remainder of his life he was a
confirmed Jeffersonian Republican who railed against aristocratic conspiracies.81
In light of Rush's background, his transformation was not as surprising as it
might seem. As Rush himself was acutely aware, he was in many ways an
outsider to the elite medical community of Philadelphia and its well-off clientele.
He came from a family of modest means and no connections. He was also a
Presbyterian in a city dominated by Quakers and Anglicans. 82 Moreover, his role
as a leading patriot in the American Revolution alienated him from a large
portion of the city's upper class with loyalist sympathies. 83
The manner in which Rush conducted his medical career further alienated his
orthodox colleagues. He enraged them by working with unlicensed and
unorthodox practitioners. As he described the situation, "I frequently exposed
myself to reproach from the regular bred [sic] of physicians by attending patients
with quacks, and with practitioners of physic [medicine] of slender education." 84
At times, Rush rationalized such cooperation in terms seemingly designed to
appeal to his orthodox colleagues' elitist sensibilities. He recalled, "I justified
this conduct by saying that I rescued the sick from the hands of ignorant men,
and gave them a better chance of being cured, and at the same time instructed
80 See generally ALYN BRODSKY, BENJAMIN RUSH: PATRIOT AND PHYSICIAN (2004).
81 LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 120-
21 (1978); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 459 (1995); RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at 58, 103; STARR,
supra note 43, at 42.
82 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 81, at 459; RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at
78-79.
83 RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at 88-89.
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[the irregular doctors] in a regular mode of practice."85 Elsewhere, however,
Rush was more generous to unschooled and alternative practitioners, maintaining
that regular doctors could learn valuable lessons from them.86 He declared
medicine to be "a science so simple"87 that it required little study and was
"obvious to the meanest capacities."88 He also condemned the standard practice
of writing prescriptions and publishing medical dissertations in Latin, charging
that the use of this language unnecessarily wrapped medicine in "mystery or
imposture." 89 Such views could not have failed to outrage Rush's snobbish
brethren in the orthodox medical community.
In addition, many elite regular physicians in Philadelphia disdained Rush's
particular medical ideas. First, he infuriated the city's established doctors by
embracing the theories of his Scottish mentor, William Cullen, while they
stubbornly clung to the older views of the Dutch physician Herman Boerhaave. 90
Then, in the late 1780s, after most of his colleagues had finally embraced
Cullen's teachings, Rush invited their wrath again by developing his own theory
of disease and treatment.9 ' Although his new approach, based on extreme
bleeding and purging, would ultimately serve as the foundation for standard
American heroic medicine in the early nineteenth century, Philadelphia's
fraternity of regulars did not immediately embrace it.92
For this combination of reasons, Philadelphia's medical elite refused to
engage in consultations with Rush and urged medical students to avoid his
lectures. 9 3 The acrimony between Rush and other regular physicians peaked in
1793, when a severe yellow fever epidemic ravaged the city. Rush vehemently
disagreed with most others in the medical establishment concerning both the
origin of and the correct response to this scourge. 9 4 The rancor of this dispute
85 Id.
86 See BENJAMIN RUSH, OBSERVATIONS ON THE DUTIES OF A PHYSICIAN, AND THE METHODS OF
IMPROVING MEDICINE ACCOMMODATED TO THE PRESENT STATE OF SOCIETY AND THE MANNERS IN
THE UNITED STATES 10 (Philadelphia, Prichard & Hall 1789).
87 RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at 88-89.
88 Benjamin Rush, "Lecture VI. Upon the Causes Which Have Retarded the Progress of
Medicine and the Means of Promoting Its Certainty and Greater Usefulness" in BENJAMIN RUSH,
SIX INTRODUCTORY LECTURES TO COURSES OF LECTURES UPON THE INSTITUTES AND PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE 157 (Philadelphia, John Conrad & Co. 1801).
89 Id. at 156.
90 BRODSKY, supra note 80, at 91-92.
91 RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at 82, 361-66 app. I ("Rush's Medical Theories");
RICHARD HARRISON SHRYOCK, MEDICINE AND SOCIETY IN AMERICA: 1660-1860, at 67-72 (1960).
92 Rush recommended, in extreme cases, the removal of up to four-fifths of the blood from
the body. Id. at 70.
93 RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at 88, 96. Rush's colleagues' purported efforts to
ruin him did not succeed; despite all the odium he was exposed to, he, by his own reckoning, "did
more business, with more profit, between the years 1769 and 1800 than any contemporary
physician in Philadelphia." Id. at 108.
94 Rush attributed the epidemic to "domestic origins" (a "noxious miasma"), whereas "nearly
the whole College of Physicians . . . derived it from a foreign country," namely, the thousands of
95
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was heightened by the curious fact that public attitudes towards the causes of
yellow fever and its appropriate treatment corresponded to political divisions,
with Republicans supporting Rush and Federalists backing his opponents. 9 5
Rush's colleagues were so vituperative toward him that following the epidemic,
he resigned from the College of Physicians. 9 6
Probably impelled, at least in part, by the intense antagonism of the medical
establishment, Rush became an outspoken advocate for medical freedom. Despite
having what his biographer calls a "somewhat immutable conviction in the
correctness . . . of his ideas," 9 7 Rush was a voice for tolerance of different
medical views. He opposed most restrictions on medical choice, including at
least some types of medical licensing. In a published 1801 lecture to the
University of Pennsylvania Medical School, Rush enumerated many "causes
which have retarded the progress" of medicine, including the following:
21 c. The interference of governments in prohibiting the use of
certain remedies, and enforcing the use of others by law. The
effects of this mistaken policy has [sic] been as hurtful to
medicine, as a similar practice with respect to opinions, has been
to the Christian religion.
22d. Conferring exclusive privileges upon bodies of physicians,
and forbidding men of equal talents and knowledge, under severe
penalties, from practising medicine within certain districts of
cities and countries. Such institutions, however sanctioned by
ancient charters and names, are the bastiles [sic] of our science.
23d. The refusal in universities to tolerate any opinions, in the
private or public exercises of candidates for degrees in medicine,
which are not taught nor believed by their professors, thus
restraining a spirit of inquiry in that period of life which is most
distinguished for ardour and invention in our science. 9 8
Frenchmen who arrived in Philadelphia after fleeing the Haitian Revolution. RUSH,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at 97; see also BRODSKY, supra note 80, at 326; ELKINS &
McKITRICK, supra note 81, at 823 n.182. Moreover, the medical establishment contemptuously
rejected Rush's recommendation that doctors battle the scourge through the use of extreme purging
and bloodletting. BRODSKY, supra note 80, at 329-32.
95 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 81, at 823 n.182.
96 RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at 98.
97 BRODSKY, supra note 80, at 345.
98 Rush, Lecture VI, supra note 89, at 151-52. In the first quoted paragraph, Rush seems to
have been alluding primarily to actions by governments in Europe, rather than the United States; at
the time Rush composed the lecture, few if any American laws had ever actually prohibited or
mandated the use of particular remedies. The second paragraph, by contrast, addressed what Rush
may have perceived to be an extant and growing problem in his own country, for about six states
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Rush's speech was not explicitly political or constitutional. He delivered it to
medical students in the interest of "our science," and most of the obstacles to
medical progress he identified concerned the attitudes and practices of physicians
themselves. Nevertheless, the speech was deeply infused with Rush's republican
worldview and his Jeffersonian devotion to limited government. Moreover, the
three quoted paragraphs contain the seeds of three persistent medical liberty
notions-freedom of conscience, economic freedom, and freedom of inquiry,
respectively-that would eventually combine with the notion of bodily freedom
to form the Thomsonians' explicitly constitutional argument for freedom of
therapeutic choice.
In the first of the quoted paragraphs, Rush anticipated much subsequent
medical freedom rhetoric by alluding to a parallel between medical freedom and
religious freedom. 99 Like many Jeffersonians, he was a committed religious
pluralist and outspoken advocate of religious liberty.100 He equated the state
imposition of orthodox medical doctrine with the despotism of an established
church and the truth-stifling effect of religious intolerance.o10 Jefferson himself
would not enact its first medical practice act until after the Civil War. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at
339; Samuel Lee Baker, Physician Licensure Laws in the United States, 1865-1915, 39 J. OF THE
HIsT. OF MED. & ALLIED ScI. 173, 196 (1984). However, as Rush was likely aware, John Morgan,
the founder of what later became the University of Pennsylvania Medical School, had petitioned
the provincial legislature in 1769 for authority to found an elect College of Physicians with the
power to examine and license practitioners. SHRYOCK, supra note 50, at 16-17. The Pennsylvania
state legislature passed a medical practice statute in 1824, but the governor vetoed it. See John
Andrew Shulze, To the Assembly Vetoing "An Act to Regulate the Practice of Physics and Surgery
Within this Commonwealth " (Dec. 8, 1824), reprinted in PAPERS OF THE GOVERNORS 1817-1832, at
542 (George Edward Reed ed., 1990).
99 In 1789, Rush had similarly declared, "Medicine has its Pharisees, as well as religion. But
the spirit of this sect is as unfriendly to the advancement of medicine, as it is to christian [sic]
charity." RUSH, DUTIES, supra note 86, at 10.
100 BRODSKY, supra note 80, at 149, 290, 306, 346; RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 34, at
339-40. Jefferson himself was the author of the 1786 Virginia Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom. In a widely circulated 1799 letter to Elbridge Gerry that became the platform for
Jefferson's 1800 presidential campaign, Jefferson declared, "I am for freedom of religion, and
against all maneuvers to bring about a legal ascendancy of one sect over another." THOMAS
JEFFERSON & NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF PRESIDENT THOMAS
JEFFERSON, 1801 AND 1805, at 3 (2001) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry
(January 26, 1799), in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 15, 18 (Paul L. Ford, ed. 1905)). On
the Jeffersonian Republican commitment to the separation of church and state, see GORDON S.
WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 587-89 (2009). In
his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson stated, "[d]ifference of opinion is advantageous in
religion." THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra, at 286 (1984).
101 The relationship between church and medicine was a longstanding one. As Rush may
have been aware, when Parliament instituted a system of examination and licensure of physicians
in 1510, it placed administration of the system in the hands of the Church of England. Ecclesiastical
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reached the same analogy from the other direction in a discussion about religious
liberty in his Notes on the State of Virginia. Bemoaning various symptoms of
"religious slavery," Jefferson remarked:
Reason and free enquiry are the only effectual agents against
error. . . . Had not free enquiry been indulged, at the zera [sic] of
reformation, the corruptions of Christianity could not have been
purged away. If it be restrained now, the present corruptions will
be protected, and new ones encouraged. Was the government to
prescribe to us our medicine and diet, our bodies would be in
such keeping as our souls are now. Thus in France the emetic
was once forbidden as medicine, and the potatoe [sic] as an
article of food. Government is just as infallible too when it fixes
systems in physics. Galileo was sent to the inquisition for
affirming that the earth was a sphere.102
Religious liberty (or freedom of conscience) and freedom of inquiry were
thus intertwined for both Jefferson and Rush.
The second quoted paragraph, by condemning the artificial privilege and
monopoly perpetuated by medical licensing, presaged the important role that the
theme of economic freedom would play in Thomsonian medical freedom
rhetoric. Just how wide Rush himself would have flung open the door to the
medical profession is not clear; he complained in the address only about the
exclusion of "men of equal talents and knowledge." Nonetheless, Rush
indisputably had a much less restrictive vision of the profession than many
regulars. This opposition to special castes and exclusive privileges was a
typically Republican position. Jeffersonians believed the granting of monopolies,
particularly to favored elites, was "destructive of the principle of equal liberty"
and inconsistent with a republican form of government. 0 3
Rush's reference to the relationship between freedom of inquiry and
scientific progress illustrates yet another theme that would prove to be enduring.
He contended that the prohibition of certain remedies was "hurtful to medicine,"
that exclusive licensing regimes were "the bastiles of our science," and that
suppression of dissenting opinions in medical schools curbed "a spirit of inquiry
in that period of life which is most distinguished for ardour and invention in our
science."
Importantly, Rush would have extended freedom of inquiry not only to
medical school students and erudite physicians, but also to irregular practitioners.
Earlier in the same address, he condemned the medical profession's "neglect to
inquire after, and record cures which have been performed ... by medicines,
102 JEFFERSON, supra note 100, at 285.
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administered by quacks, or by the friends of sick people." 04 Twelve years
before, in a published speech to the University of Pennsylvania's graduating
medical students, Rush had declared:
Let me remind you, that improvement in medicine is not to be
derived only from colleges and universities. . . . [T]hose facts
which constitute real knowledge, are to be met with in every
walk of life. Remember how many of our most useful remedies
have been discovered by quacks. Do not be afraid, therefore, of
conversing with them, and of profiting by their ignorance and
temerity in the practice of physic. . . . But further.-In the
pursuit of medical knowledge, let me advise you to converse
with nurses and old women. . .. Even negroes and Indians have
sometimes stumbled upon discoveries in medicine. Be not
ashamed to inquire into them.' 05
Rush's views regarding the value of experimentation by the common man
were also typical of early nineteenth-century republicanism. Despite Jefferson's
own belief in a "natural aristocracy," his followers increasingly asserted that
popular knowledge was as accurate and beneficial as the knowledge of experts.'0 6
As I will discuss in Part 111,107 similar themes to those contained in Rush's
medical freedom discourse would pervade the Thomsonians' anti-licensing
rhetoric of the 1830s. Like Rush, the Thomsonians emphasized the parallel
between medical freedom and religious freedom. Their literature was similarly
filled with attacks on monopoly and "aristocratic privilege." They, too, asserted
that scientific progress depended on freedom of inquiry and trumpeted the
medical discoveries made by unschooled practitioners. However, as I will also
explain in Part III, the Thomsonians added to their argument an important strain
of medical freedom strikingly absent from Rush's speech-namely, bodily
freedom.
D. Rush's Legacy
1. Rush and the Thomsonians
Before turning to the Thomsonian campaign against medical licensing, it is
worth considering whether and how Rush influenced them. Interestingly, despite
his heroic approach to medicine, Rush is generally portrayed with admiration in
Thomsonian literature. This favorable attitude likely derived largely from Samuel
104 Rush, Lecture VI, supra note 88, at 151.
105 RUSH, DUTIES, supra note 86, at 10.
106 WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 100, at 725-28.
107 Infra Section III.E.
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Thomson's depiction of his one encounter with Rush. In his widely circulated
autobiographical narrative,108 Thomson related how in 1813, he visited Rush and
Benjamin Smith Barton, another University of Pennsylvania professor, to request
their assistance in "introducing my system of practice to the world."' 09 Although
Rush "was so much engaged, that I was unable to have but little conversation,"
he "treated me with much politeness; and said that whatever Dr. Barton agreed to
he would give his consent." 0 According to Thomson, Barton graciously agreed
to accept some of Thomson's medicine and "make a trial of it.""' Unfortunately,
both professors died relatively soon afterward, thus depriving Thomson "of the
influence of these two men, which I was confident would otherwise have been
exerted in my favour.""l 2
Thomson's followers, probably influenced by this account, regularly referred
to Rush with adulatory phrases such as the "great Dr. Rush."" 3 They highlighted
the fact that the "much-distinguished" Rush, like their own mentor, believed in
the "unity of disease and of cure."ll 4 They depicted Rush (somewhat accurately)
as open-minded and (inaccurately) as ambivalent about his own variety of heroic
treatments." 5 One Thomsonian lecturer, with some justification, characterized
Rush as believing that "some lonely weed, trampled in the earth, might furnish a
cure which had baffled all the wisdom of the schools."" 6 But another speaker
confused Rush's willingness to consider the benefits of herbal medicine with a
wholesale rejection of orthodox principles. This lecturer asserted that Rush
"opened the cry" in the United States against the orthodox "practice of poisoning
the human system."" 7 With no apparent basis, the Thomsonians repeatedly
108 Because this narrative was published in the same volume as Thomson's Guide to Health,
the handbook of Thomsonian medicine, enormous numbers of Thomsonians around the country
possessed it. SAMUEL THOMSON, NEW GUIDE TO HEALTH; OR, BOTANIC FAMILY PHYSICIAN.
CONTAINING A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF PRACTICE ON A PLAN ENTIRELY NEW: WITH A DESCRIPTION OF
THE VEGETABLES MADE USE OF, AND DIRECTIONS FOR PREPARING AND ADMINISTERING THEM, To
CURE DISEASE. To WHICH IS PREFIXED A NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE AND MEDICAL DISCOVERIES OF THE
AUTHOR (2d ed. 1825) [hereinafter NARRATIVE].
109 Id. at 123. Whereas Thomson proudly highlighted this encounter in his autobiography,
Rush did not mention it in his own.
110 Id.
11 1 Id.
112 Id. at 124.
113 See, e.g., Dr. T. Hersey, A Lecture on the Comparative Merits of the Patent Steam
Practice of Dr. Samuel K. Jennings and Dr. Samuel Thomson, 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 193, 197
(1834) ("the great Dr. Rush").
114 R. H. Brumby, Medical Botanist, 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 367, 368 (1834).
115 See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PATENT
MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 37 (1972) (referring to the "self-confident
way in which [Rush] advocated his theories").
116 Lecture by M. W. McCraw, in Proceedings of the Mecklenburg Branch Society, 2
THOMSONIAN RECORDER 401, 406 (1834).
117 SAMUEL ROBINSON, A COURSE OF FIFTEEN LECTURES, ON MEDICAL BOTANY,
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quoted Rush as saying that the art of healing was like "an unroofed temple:-
Uncovered at the top, and cracked at the foundation."" 8
Despite the Thomsonians' high regard for Rush, and the seeming echoes of
his 1801 address that sounded throughout their own writings, it is far from clear
that they were actually familiar with the speech. They never quoted from the
lecture. Nevertheless, as I will show below," 9 the Thomsonians appear to have
absorbed Rush's arguments through cultural osmosis, even if they did not borrow
them directly. At the very least, the esteemed Philadelphia physician and the
radical botanical healers drew from the same intellectual and political traditions.
2. The Posthumous Transformation ofRush into Constitutional Advocate
Rush's speech eventually found its way into non-Thomsonian anti-licensing
literature. In 1838 or 1839, an American journal dedicated to the growing school
of homeopathy reproduced much of the 1801 address-including the above-
quoted passages.12 0 Thereafter, medical licensing opponents quoted Rush's
paragraph opposing "exclusive privileges" with increasing frequency for the
remainder of the century. Then, in the first decade of the twentieth century,
opponents of restrictive licensing creatively expanded Rush's words into a
constitutional argument for medical freedom. In 1907, the Journal of the
American Osteopathic Association conjured up the following imaginary
declaration by Rush:
The constitution of this republic should make specific provision
for medical freedom as well as for religious freedom. To restrict
the practice of the art of healing to one class of physicians and
deny to others equal privileges constitutes the bastiles of our
science. All such laws are un-American and despotic. They are
vestiges of monarchy and have no place in a republic.121
Over the course of the twentieth century, this fictitious rendering of Rush's
THAT HAVE PRECEDED IT, ARE REVIEWED AND COMPARED 10 (Columbus, Horton Howard 1829).
118 The earliest attribution of this quotation to Rush (or anyone) that I can find is in an 1829
Thomsonian publication. Id. at 16.
119 Infra Section Ill.E.
120 MISCELLANIES ON HOMOEOPATHY 159 (Ass'n of Homeopathic Physicians ed., 1839)
(including a reissue of the 1838-1839 American Journal of Homeopathy). Although the three
paragraphs on medical freedom are identical to those in Rush's 1801 University of Pennsylvania
address, they are enumerated differently, and the speech overall is abridged. It is unclear whether
the homeopathic publication shortened Rush's speech on its own, acquired an abridged transcript of
the speech, or acquired a transcript of a similar speech delivered by Rush at another event.
121 Directory of Members (Attachment), 6 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN OSTEOPATHIC
ASSOCIATION 29 (1907). Although this is the earliest instance I could find of a claim that Rush had
called for a constitutional provision protecting medical freedom, the editor of this journal might, of
course, have borrowed these words from some other unidentified source.
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words took on a life of its own. A Google search today reveals thousands of web
pages that ascribe this precise language, or some variant of it, to Rush. His
imagined advocacy of a medical freedom amendment to the Constitution has
become fact in cyberspace. The truth that he never actually called for such an
amendment should not, however, obscure his actual emphatic opposition to state
interference in medical affairs.
III. AMERICAN HEALTH LIBERTARIANISM BETWEEN 1820 AND THE CIVIL WAR
Starting around 1820, two major shifts occurred in the story of medical
licensing in America. First, Thomsonian practitioners, patients, and supporters
transformed a previously widespread, but uncoordinated, anti-licensing sentiment
into a passionate, multi-pronged popular constitutional movement. Second, and
not coincidentally, state medical practice acts began to disappear from the statute
books.
A. The Decline and Fall ofAntebellum Medical Licensing
The 1820s were the fulcrum of an abrupt shift in state legislative activity
with respect to medical licensing. In the first twenty-four states to enter the union
and the District of Columbia, every pertinent legislative enactment passed prior
to 1820 was designed to either create or strengthen a licensing regime. In stark
contrast, between 1830 and 1860, every relevant legislative action in these states
(with a couple of minor exceptions) either weakened or entirely revoked medical
licensing.122 Some states took initial steps of lowering the penalty for practicing
without a license, exempting certain classes of irregular practitioners from the
licensing requirement, or both. 123 Eventually, however, most states repealed their
medical licensing regimes altogether.12 4 Moreover, in about half of the states that
125still had licensing laws, these statutes did not subject violators to any penalty.12
According to one author, "[F]or half a century after 1820 licensing requirements
apparently deteriorated. By the 1850s, when German authorities were
122 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 332-39 app. II. One exception was an 1847 statute in
Georgia, which reversed an 1839 evisceration of the licensing system, but created an independent
Botanico-Medical licensing board to license botanical physicians. Id. at 334. The other exception
was an 1859 statute in North Carolina, which established a licensing board for the first time in that
state. Id. at 339.
123 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 332-39 app. 11. State statutes variously exempted
Thomsonians, botanical practitioners, and homeopaths. Id.
124 It is difficult to gather precise statistics regarding the revocation of antebellum state
medical licensing statutes, but the sources leave no doubt that repeal was extremely widespread.
See CASSEDY, supra note 53, at 26 (between 1830 and 1845, eleven states repealed their laws);
HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 200 ("By mid century, fifteen state legislatures
had repudiated medical licensure"); WHORTON, NATURE CURES, supra note 29, at 36 ("By 1850 all
but two states' licensing statutes had been swept from the books.").
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establishing uniform standards and when the British government was taking the
first steps toward national control, the situation in the United States seemed to be
approaching its nadir." 2 6
An examination of the statutes alone actually understates the disintegration
of medical licensing in the antebellum period. As noted previously, even at the
apex of medical licensing in the late 1810s and early I 820s, the laws'
effectiveness was uneven, at best. 12 7 But as the century advanced, the shrinking
number of medical practice acts still on the books increasingly became wholly
irrelevant. Executive authorities, apparently aware of the public's growing
distaste for restricting the practice of medicine, often simply failed to enforce the
statutes.128 Some of the remaining licensing boards settled into a state of
permanent hibernation. 2 9
By the 1840s, contemporary commentators agreed that medical licensing
was, for all practical purposes, finished. In an 1844 article, a New York observer
of the national scene remarked:
The conclusion which may be drawn is, that when restrictive
laws are really efficient and enforced, they protect the
community against inexperience and its consequences, but that
popular sentiment is opposed to them; consequently the law is
either so drawn as to be inefficient, or is, in nine out of ten cases,
openly violated with impunity, whilst its existence is such as to
get up a feeling of hostility to the regular profession.'30
The president of the Ohio State Medical Society observed in 1849 that "all
enactments upon the subject of medicine or prescriptions under fines, penalties,
or the like, are extremely difficult of execution and have impracticability and
soon become a dead letter."' 3' In his renowned 1850 report on public health in
Massachusetts, Lemuel Shattuck wryly observed: "Any one, male or female,
learned or ignorant, an honest man or a knave, can assume the name of a
physician, and 'practice' upon any one, to cure or to kill, as either may happen,
without accountability. 'It's a free country!"'l 32 According to one scholar, "By
126 SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING, supra note 50, at 27.
127 See id. ("the promise of early American laws proved illusory"); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6,
at 79 ("None of the licensing laws in this period was [sic] ever effective.").
128 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 77-78.
129 Id. at 332-39 app. II.
130 Charles Coventry, History of Medical Legislation in the State of New York, 4 N.Y. J. OF
MED. & COLLATERAL SCI. 151, 160 (Mar. 1845).
131 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 78.
132 LEMUEL SHATTUCK, REPORT OF A GENERAL PLAN FOR THE PROMOTION OF PUBLIC AND
PERSONAL HEALTH DEVISED, PREPARED AND RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED
UNDER A RESOLVE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS, RELATING TO A SANITARY SURVEY OF
THE STATE 58 (1850).
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the time of the Civil War, no effective medical licensing existed in any of the
states." 3 3
What happened? The antebellum medical licensing regimes succumbed to
the country's first broad popular movement promoting medical freedom, led by
the Thomsonians. These medical freedom advocates drew copiously from all four
of the contributing strands of medical liberty identified above-bodily freedom,
economic freedom, freedom of inquiry, and freedom of religion and conscience.
In petitions, journals, and speeches, the Thomsonians framed a successful,
multidimensional libertarian argument against medical licensing. And although
they advanced their case entirely outside of court, their contentions were
unmistakably constitutional.
B. The Thomsonians
Samuel Thomson (1769-1843) was raised on a remote New Hampshire farm
in humble circumstances and lacked any formal education. As a boy, he became
fascinated by herbal remedies under the tutelage of a local widow. He suffered a
severe ankle wound at age nineteen and attributed his recovery to botanical cures.
In his early twenties, Thomson renounced regular medicine altogether after
watching in horror as the heroic treatments of orthodox doctors apparently
hastened his mother's death from consumption and then nearly finished off his
young wife when she suffered complications following childbirth.13 4
Thomson began to develop his own healing system while treating his family
and neighbors. Beginning in 1805, he roamed around northern New England,
offering his services to townsfolk and establishing a few medical offices.' 35 The
commercially savvy Thomson soon conceived an innovative business plan; he
sold franchises-the right to use his system and proprietary remedies-to
families in advance of any illness.' 36 Thomson obtained a patent for his
medicines and their method of use in 1813, filed copyrights for his New Guide to
Health and his autobiographical narrative in 1822, and fiercely guarded his
intellectual property until the end of his life. 1' Eventually, Thomson built a
nationwide business empire, undergirded by an army of agents, thirteen editions
of his bestselling New Guide to Health, a network of Friendly Botanic Societies,
and annual United States Thomsonian Botanic Conventions.' 38 Thomsonianism
became wildly popular in the 1830s, especially in the South and Midwest. In
1839, Thomson himself boasted that three million Americans-approximately
133 JOHN S. HALLER, AMERICAN MEDICINE IN TRANSITION, 1840-1910, at 201 (1981).
134 HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 10-13.
135 Id. at 14-19, 32.
136 Id. at 32-35.
137 Id. at 37-40, 49.
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twenty percent of the population-were adherents of his method.' 39 One modem
scholar surmises that Thomson's estimate, while likely exaggerated, did not
vastly exceed the true number.14 0
Although the Thomsonians stridently disparaged regular doctors' use of
dangerous mineral remedies, their system shared certain central characteristics
with orthodox medicine, including a reductionist understanding of disease as a
fundamental bodily imbalance and a uniform therapeutic method based on the
evacuation of bodily fluids.141 Thomson posited that all illness derived from the
body's loss of natural heat, and his treatment regime was designed to restore the
patient's "vital warmth" by clearing bodily obstructions through perspiration,
purging, and vomiting.142 The emblematic components of the Thomsonian
healing system were lobelia (an emetic herb), cayenne pepper, and steam
baths.14 3 Despite its resemblance to regular medicine, Thomson's course of
treatment was probably less enervating than the use of calomel and bleeding.144
Many were attracted to the Thomsonians' use of "natural" vegetable-based
remedies instead of mineral compounds such as calomel.
Although Thomson derived his system largely a priori from unproven
premises about the nature of the human body and disease, Thomsonians took
pride in being more "empirical" than the regulars. They viewed themselves as
ascribing more value to actual experience and less to abstruse theory than regular
physicians.145 Whereas orthodox doctors often used the term "empiric" as an
insulting moniker for undereducated, "unscientific" alternative practitioners, the
Thomsonians embraced the label.14 6 They condemned orthodox medicine for its
abstract speculation, as well as for its ineffective and dangerous treatments.
The 1830s (the period from which most of the quotations in this section
derive) were a tumultuous decade for Thomsonians. Samuel Thomson himself
became progressively more self-important, fanatical, and vengeful. He tolerated
no variation from his therapeutic methods and denied that conventional scientific
education had any value to medicine whatsoever.14 7 But the patriarch's
unquestioning disciples were increasingly outnumbered by flexible advocates of
a more general botanic cause.14 8 The most prominent of these open-minded
Thomsonians was likely Alva Curtis, the editor of the Thomsonian Recorder, the
139 WHORTON, NATURE CURES, supra note 124, at 39.
140 Id. at 39.
141 HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 17-18, 29-30, 39-40.
142 Id. at 17-24.
143 Id. at 21-22, 24-29.
144 Id. at 30.
145 WHORTON, NATURE CURES, supra note 29, at 10-12.
146 HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 51.
147 Id. at 147-59.
148 Id. at 67-73, 139, 154.
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oldest and most popular botanic magazine in the nation.14 9 In 1836, Curtis
(whose words open this Article) defied Thomson on the educational issue by
founding the initially unchartered Botanico-Medical College of Ohio, whose
curriculum incorporated lectures and texts on basic science.'so In 1838, Curtis led
a secession of "Independent Thomsonians" away from the purists-a schism
impelled by the Independents' desire for freedom to explore improvements to Dr.
Thomson's system, including expansion of its materia medica.15
It is important to recognize the issues of social status that swirled around the
Thomsonian movement. While by the 1830s Thomsonianism was attracting some
middle class and wealthy followers, 5 2 it remained at its core "a rural and lower-
class phenomenon."' 53 Thomsonians were, during this era, driven by populist
passion-a rejection of elite practitioners, institutions, and knowledge. In this
respect, they were representative of a broad, egalitarian political culture with
affinity to President Andrew Jackson's Democratic Party-a political culture that
frequently exhibited a fierce libertarian opposition to government intrusion into
private affairs.
C. The Thomsonians and Jacksonian Liberty
To fully grasp the Thomsonians' broad vision of medical freedom, and the
appeal of their message, one must understand that they were overwhelmingly
Jacksonian Democrats.15 4 The Jacksonians generally were not laissez-faire
absolutists.'55 Nonetheless, they, along with their Jeffersonian Republican
149 Id. at 215. Curtis renamed the publication the Botanico-Medical Recorder in 1838.
150 Id. at 94-98. The school was located in Columbus.
151 Id. at 170-73.
152 Id. at 143.
153 CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS 72 (1962). William G. Rothstein states that
"[a]lthough most of the eastern supporters of Thomsonism [sic] were lower class ... the system
was popular with all social classes in the midwest and south." ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 141.
154 Scholars routinely identify Thomsonianism with Jacksonian Democracy. See, e.g., STARR,
supra note 43, at 56-57; HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 63; WHORTON, NATURE
CURES, supra note 29, at 33-35; SHRYOCK, supra note 50, at 31. One author recently contended
that, at least in Connecticut, the Thomsonians who opposed licensing in the late 1830s and early
I840s were more "professionalized" and "conservative" than is usually assumed. He concluded that
while the Connecticut Thomsonians drew more support from the state's weak Democratic Party
than from the Whigs, they were not interested in a broader populist Jacksonian agenda. See Toby
A. Appel, The Thomsonian Movement, the Regular Profession, and the State in Antebellum
Connecticut: A Case Study of the Repeal of Early Medical Licensing Laws, 65 J. OF THE HIST. OF
MED. & ALLIED SC. 153 (2010). Nevertheless, this scholar acknowledges, "Compared to other
states, Connecticut's Thomsonian story falls toward the conservative end of a spectrum." Id. at 185.
155 Jacksonians mistrusted big business rather than economic regulation per se and thus
embraced some regulation not deemed to advance the interests of self-aggrandizing moneyed
aristocrats. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 505 (2009); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 43 (1996). Furthermore, the issue of slavery led
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forebears, probably had the most comprehensive libertarian philosophy of any
major political culture in American history.'16 As described by Marvin Meyers,
Jacksonians believed that a "laissez-faire society . . . would re-establish
continuity with that golden age in which liberty and progress were joined
inseparably with simple yeoman virtues.""' Whereas the Jacksonians' Whig
opponents supported an active role for the government in funding and facilitating
economic development, the Jacksonians tended to reject such measures as special
legislation favoring privileged patricians. They had an almost paranoid view of
the grasping "money power's" ability to control the organs of government." 8
Jacksonian laissez-faireism was thus populist in spirit, reflecting a view that
economic regulations were the instruments of corrupt, scheming elites striving to
aggrandize their wealth and power at the expense of the common man. The
Jacksonian journalist William Leggett believed (in Marvin Meyers' words):
"Freedom is . . . freedom from chartered exploitation, from 'aristocratic
innovation."'L
5 9
The Whigs and Jacksonians also disagreed about government's appropriate
posture with respect to religion and the regulation of private behavior. The Whigs
believed the state should enforce moral standards and promote cultural
homogeneity; accordingly, they supported temperance laws, obligatory Sabbath
observance, and a broad partnership between church and state to advance a
"national religion."' 60 Jacksonians, on the other hand-with the support of the
vast majority of the nation's Catholics-opposed temperance laws, embraced the
strict separation of church and state, and generally "made room for widely
divergent private behavior."' 6'
assembly, and petition. KENNETH IRA KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER
THE LAW 76-80 (2003).
156 For a discussion of the "republican theory and practice" that bridged the Jeffersonian and
Jacksonian political cultures, see HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF
JACKSONIAN AMERICA 42-72 (2006).
157 MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 12 (1960).
158 WATSON, supra note 156, at 167.
159 MEYERS, supra note 157, at 194-95. Samuel Thomson's own view of the inordinate
power of the regular physicians in combination with their governmental sponsors is illustrated by
his complaint that "the doctors have so much influence in society . . . that the common people are
kept back from a knowledge of what is of the utmost importance for them to know. If any man
undertakes to pursue a practice different from what is sanctioned by the regular faculty . . . he is
hunted down like a wild beast; and a hue and cry raised against him from one end of the country to
the other." THOMSON, NARRATIVE, supra note 108, at 8.
160 ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON 137-40, 352-54 (1945); HOWE, supra
note 155, at 583; WATSON, supra note 156, at 245.
161 WATSON, supra note 156, at 242; SCHLESINGER, supra note 160, at 354-56. On Catholic
support, see HOWE, supra note 155, at 581, 688. Interestingly, alcohol consumption presented a
challenge to the Thomsonian philosophy, as demonstrated by the treatment of the topic in Curtis'
Thomsonian Recorder. Although alcohol was a common part of the regular physician's
dispensatory, Curtis did not reject its use out of hand; for example, he acknowledged its efficacy as
a cholera preventive. Brandy, Cholera, and Cholera Syrup, 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 117 (1834).
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In short, in the words of historian Daniel Walker Howe, "Whigs had a
positive conception of liberty; they treasured it as a means to the formation of
individual character and a good society. Democrats, by contrast, held a negative
conception of liberty; they saw it as freeing the common (white) man from the
oppressive burdens of an aristocracy."l 6 2 The popular Jacksonian magazine
Democratic Review maintained that the "principle of [America's] organization"
was a collection of four freedoms: "freedom of conscience, freedom of person,
freedom of trade and business pursuits, [and] universality of freedom and
equality."1 6 3 The Thomsonians would embrace all of these in their fight against
medical licensing statutes.
D. The Thomsonians' Constitutional Struggle
The Thomsonians' battle for medical freedom was an explicitly
constitutional one, even though they apparently did not attempt to challenge any
state medical practice acts in court.IM The Thomsonians and their supporters
instead waged their successful struggle against the orthodox medical
establishment by using the press, petitions, and party politics to influence
legislators and governors. As mentioned above, citizens also used their power as
jurors to undermine medical licensing statutes, and executive officials often
responded to popular opposition to such laws by declining to enforce them.
Why did the Thomsonians and their supporters not use lawsuits as an
additional or alternative tactic? Perhaps they believed that such actions would be
futile. Jacksonians generally viewed the courts as bastions of antidemocratic
aristocracy, especially in states that had not yet embraced judicial elections. The
Thomsonians may thus have viewed judges as prejudiced in favor of the
privileged class of regular physicians. 165 The concern about judicial bias in favor
of licensing may have been exacerbated by Thomsonian knowledge of a parallel
struggle occurring in the legal profession during this era. The elite portion of the
bar, which many judges identified with, was fighting its own (losing) battle
against a Jacksonian movement to eliminate the already-low requirements for
Moreover, Curtis expressly advocated tolerance for the use of wine for sacramental purposes.
Temerance [sic] Society, 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 279 (1834). At the same time, however, he saw
the consumption of alcoholic beverages outside medical and religious uses as a "depraved
appetite." Brandy, Cholera, and Cholera Syrup, supra, at 118.
162 HOWE, supra note 155, at 583.
163 John L. O'Sullivan, The Great Nation of Futurity, 6 U.S. MAG & DEM. REV. 23, 430
(1839).
164 I have been unable to identify a single antebellum case challenging the constitutionality of
a state medical practice law.
165 For discussions of attitudes toward courts and judges in Jacksonian America, see
generally Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaulation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 191 (1993); Jed Handelsman
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practicing law.166 Arguably, the judiciary actually led this effort to maintain
restrictions on access to the legal profession. 16 7
Furthermore, opponents of medical licensing were likely aware that
antebellum courts did not typically strike down legislation based on the
application of broad constitutional principles.' 68 As one scholar has noted,
flexibly phrased constitutional provisions "could hardly form the bases for
judicial review of legislation until jurists became used to adjudging the
reasonableness of legislation in the late nineteenth century." 6 9
Finally-and importantly-Americans at this stage in history simply did not
view courts as the exclusive, or even primary, arena for contesting constitutional
principles. In the Jacksonian era, all of the nonjudicial methods used to shape
constitutional meaning during the Revolutionary period-except perhaps
mobbing170-were still considered valid vehicles for popular constitutionalism.
The important difference was that party politics had become the chief means by
which the people expressed their constitutional understandings.' 7 1 In light of this
development, one scholar describes the Jacksonian era as an age of "party-based
popular constitutionalism."l 7 2 The legislative and executive departments were
deemed to have at least as much of a role in constitutional interpretation as the
courts, and the people sought, through a wide variety of party-based activities, to
ensure that these elected branches acted in accordance with their constitutional
vision. In Larry Kramer's words, "Democratic-dominated governments at both
the state and national levels successfully marginalized the judiciary . . . and
166 RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 40-41 (1989); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, REVISED EDITION 315-18 (1985). In the antebellum years, admission
to the bar required, at most, a period of apprenticeship and passage of an oral bar examination
administered by a local judge. The proportion of states mandating a period of apprenticeship
dropped from fourteen out of nineteen in 1800, to eleven out of thirty in 1840, to nine out of thirty-
one in 1860. ABEL, supra, at 40. Lawrence Friedman points out, "In the 1840s, a few states
eliminated all requirements for admission to the bar, except good moral character." FRIEDMAN,
supra, at 316-17.
167 See MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876, at
139 (1999) ("[I]t was the judiciary ... that did most to establish the guidelines for legal practice.").
168 Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions Into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's
Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 529-30 (2004) ("Remarkably, hardly any
constitutional question arose in the antebellum United States that was resolved into a judicial
question.").
169 Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and
Origins ofLaissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 322 (1985).
170 KRAMER, supra note 22, at 168.
171 Id. at 167-68.
172 Keith E. Whittington, Give "the People" What They Want, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 911,
918 (2006). According to Whittington, mass political parties were especially effective instruments
for vindicating constitutional principles during the Jacksonian era because they were organized
around constitutional principles, exerted great centralized discipline over their members, and
uncompromisingly controlled the government once in power. Id. at 914-15.
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reasserted popular control over constitutional development."173 In short, the fact
that the Thomsonians advanced their arguments in forums other than court
should not obscure the fact they were constitutional arguments and that, for them,
medical liberty was a constitutional imperative.
The earliest suggestion I have found of a widespread challenge to the
constitutionality of medical licensing is contained in an 1824 message by
Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Shulze accompanying his veto of a medical
practice statute. In this document, Schulze questioned "the expediency of
enacting a law, which a large and respectible [sic] portion of the community
believe to be contrary to the best established principles of the [C]onstitution."l 7 4
It is unclear who exactly these members of the community were and how they
communicated their views to the governor. Nonetheless, this veto message offers
an intriguing hint that as early as 1824, citizens were, perhaps in an organized
manner, voicing constitutional arguments for freedom of therapeutic choice to
the political branches of the government.
Another of the earliest explicit assertions of the unconstitutionality of
medical licensing came from the pen of a prominent member of the academic
medical elite-Professor Benjamin Waterhouse of Harvard.' 75 Waterhouse was a
personal friend of Samuel Thomson and one of the few members of the regular
medical profession who respected his work, although, in Waterhouse's own
words, he wished that Thomson's "science had been commensurate to his
experience and natural sagacity."l 7 6 Like Rush, Waterhouse was an ardent
Jeffersonian and anti-Federalist, and he believed that Thomson was being vilified
because of his Republican principles. 77
In an 1825 letter to a New York correspondent, delivered by Thomson
himself, Waterhouse asked, "How came your Legislature to pass so
unconstitutional an act as that called the anti-quack law?"'17 8 This dispatch may
have emboldened the Thomsonians to launch an explicitly constitutional fight
173 KRAMER, supra note 22, at 205.
174 Shulze, supra note 98, at 542, 543, in 5 PA. ARCHIVES Fourth Ser. (George Edward Reed
ed., 1900).
175 Waterhouse (1754-1846) served at Harvard from 1783 until 1812 as one of the school's
original professors of medicine but left because of personal conflicts with the rest of the faculty. He
is best known as the pioneer of the use of cowpox vaccination for smallpox prevention in the
United States.
176 JoHN W. COMFORT, THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE ON THOMSONIAN PRINCIPLES, ADAPTED AS
WELL TO THE USE OF FAMILIES, AS TO THAT OF THE PRACTITIONER. CONTAINING A BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCH OF DR. THOMSON xxxv-xxxvi (1850). Waterhouse came to approve of Thomson's use of a
combination of lobelia and vapor baths, although there is no evidence that he ever, like Thomson,
embraced this as a primary or universal remedy. See id. at xxxvi.
177 HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 54-56.
178 Samuel Waterhouse, Copy of a Letter from Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse, Formerly Lecturer
on the Theory and Practice of Physic, in Cambridge University, to the Late Samuel L. Mitchell, of
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against medical licensing. The fact that the letter was, seven years later,
reproduced early in the very first volume of the Thomsonian Recorder hints at
the importance they ascribed to it.
Regardless of how the Thomsonians conceived the idea of launching an
explicitly constitutional attack, in the early 1830s, they took the lead in
elaborating on and publicizing the constitutional arguments. Consider, for
example, a lengthy 1832 piece in the Thomsonian Recorder titled "An Essay in
Relation to the Unconstitutionality, Injustice, and Injurious Effects, Resulting
from Our Present Aristocratical Medical Law in the State of Ohio."179
Pseudonymously authored, in Revolutionary-era fashion, by "Honestus," the
article reads like a legal document-similar to a brief or bill of particulars.
Honestus condemns the licensing statute as "contrary to the letter and spirit of the
constitution and a direct and undeniable violation of the oath of legislators,
whereby they are sworn to maintain that sacred charter of our liberties."o80 He
then goes on to explain why the law violates various provisions of the Ohio state
constitution, including the guarantee of the "natural and unalienable rights" of
"enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting
property, pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety" and the prohibition
against laws impairing the validity of contracts.' '
Other examples of Thomsonian constitutional rhetoric abound. In 1834, the
Friendly Botanic Society of New York City adopted resolutions against New
York State's medical practice law, including a preamble declaring, "[W]e . . . feel
ourselves aggrieved by the passage of such an act, because we are restricted from
and denied the privilege of exercising those dear rights guaranteed to us by our
forefathers in the invaluable Constitution of our beloved nation."' 82 In an 1832
petition presented to the Ohio legislature, citizens declared their "unalienable and
constitutional rights violated" by an 1824 Ohio medical act.'83
When asserting the unconstitutionality of medical practice acts, the
Thomsonians frequently appealed not only to the words of the state and federal
constitutions, but also to fundamental rights embodied in the Declaration of
Independence and vindicated on the battlefields of the Revolutionary War. Such
statements were concrete examples of the "thin constitutionalism" celebrated by
Mark Tushnet. Take, for instance, a lengthy 1837 editorial in the Thomsonian
Recorder titled "The Declaration of Independence." The author of this unsigned
179 Honestus, An Essay in Relation to the Unconstitutionality, Injustice, and Injurious Effects,
Resulting from Our Present Aristocratical Medical Law in the State of Ohio, I THOMSONIAN
RECORDER 121 (1832).
180 Id. at 124.
181 Id. at 130-31.
182 Preamble and Resolutions of the Friendly Botanic Society of the City and County of New
York (Apr. 7, 1834), reprinted in 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 242-43 (1834). These documents are
discussed in more detail infra Subsection Ill.El.
183 Petition to be presented to the next Legislature, I THOMSONIAN RECORDER 24 (1832).
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piece (possibly Alva Curtis) starts by roughly quoting the actual Declaration. "On
July 4th, 1776, it was declared by the Representatives of these United States, in
Congress assembled, to be 'self-evident, that all men were created equal and
endowed by their Creator, with certain inalienable rights, among which are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. "'84 He then asserts that the federal and state
constitutions were formed "[i]n accordance with these principles" and that all of
them "substantially declare[] that all enactments of men . . . which are opposed to
these principles, are null, void and of no effect."' 85 The author continues his
introduction as follows:
These propositions [from the Declaration of Independence],
having been admitted for sixty-one years to be self evident, we
shall spend a portion of this day in proving it susceptible of the
clearest demonstration, that all the laws in the United States
which make it a misdemeanor for any but a member of "the
Regular Medical Faculty" to administer remedies to cure the
sick, or for any person to employ and pay whom he pleases as
his physician; or that prevent any man from recovering, by
process of common law, a just reward for medical services that
had been voluntarily solicited and faithfully performed, are
unconstitutional, oppressive, and wicked.'16
The editorial's final call to action is addressed to the "[s]ons of the patriotic
sires who nobly resisted laws made without their consent; who, half clothed and
half starved, poured out for seven years their treasures and their blood, to secure
to you, their posterity, equal enjoyment of your inalienable rights."'"
E. The Multiple Strands of Medical Freedom
The Thomsonians' specific arguments against medical licensing statutes
demonstrate that they had a multidimensional vision of the constitutional right to
freedom of therapeutic choice. In their view, medical freedom implicated various
categories of inalienable liberties protected by the country's founding documents
and by higher law. As I will show below, the Thomsonians referred repeatedly to
all four of the strands of freedom identified earlier-bodily freedom, economic
freedom, freedom of religion and conscience, and freedom of inquiry.
184 The Declaration ofIndependence, 5 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 326, 326 (1837).
185 Id.
186 Id. The editorial concludes, "Thus we see that these laws ... abolish inalienable, natural
rights that are above all laws or constitutions: and not only this; they suspend the action of the very
decree of Heaven, 'Ye shall not defraud nor oppress your brother-and whoso sheddeth man's
blood, by man shall his blood be shed."' Id. at 329.
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1. Bodily Freedom
To modem ears, the Thomsonian arguments that sound most familiar are
those concerning the right of control over one's body. One version of this
argument was the assertion that people have a right to decide what and what not
to put into their bodies. In particular, the Thomsonians insisted that citizens
should be free to avoid the dangerous remedies employed by regular physicians.
Honestus asked, "If I be conscientiously opposed to bleeding, blistering,
mercurialising [sic], or poisoning with emetic tartar, opium, arsenic, or prussic
acid, shall I be compelled to employ a law-made doctor, who deals almost
exclusively in these potent remedies?"188 A legislative committee considering
repeal of the New York medical practice law painted a particularly vivid picture,
stating that the legislature should not "thrust calomel and mercury down a man's
throat while he wills to take only cayenne or lobelia." 89
A related Thomsonian argument with parallels in modem rhetoric was the
contention that each individual has a right to choose what steps to take to protect
his or her physical well-being. For instance, in resolutions adopted in 1834 by the
Friendly Botanic Society of New York City against New York State's medical
practice law, the Society maintained a "freedom to choose the means which we
believe are best calculated to secure to us health and life." 90 This document
further stated, "A large majority of us are private citizens [i.e., not practitioners],
and are deprived of the privilege . . . of calling on such physicians as we prefer,
that we may have health restored to us when suffering from the inroads of
disease."' 9' The author of the "Declaration of Independence," after condemning
the "poisons" administered by regular physicians, maintained, "To give poisons,
is to deprive men of sound health, if not the whole of vitality or life; and,
therefore unconstitutional and wicked." 92 An 1831 or 1832 petition against the
New Jersey medical practice act declared: "In matters which concern our LIVES,
we conceive it to be our interest, and that it should be our privilege, to choose
188 Honestus, supra note 179, at 130.
189 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 145 (quoting Report of Minority of Select Committee, in
TRANSACTIONS OF THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 241, 243-44 (1841). The
Thomsonians sometimes contended for a broader freedom of consumption, encompassing foods as
well as medicines. For example, protesting a Columbus, Ohio ordinance prohibiting commerce in
fruits and vegetables to control the spread of cholera, the Thomsonian Recorder asked: "Is it not an
invasion of the rights and privileges of the people to refuse them the liberty of buying and using the
usual articles of diet?" For the Recorder (Editorial), 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 11, 11 (1833).
190 Preamble & Resolutions of the Friendly Botanic Society of the City and County of New
York (April 7, 1834), in 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 241, 243 (1834).
191 Id. at 243. In his 1824 message accompanying his veto of a medical practice bill, the
Pennsylvania governor similarly referred to "the right which every man claims of employing the
person, who, in his opinion, may be best qualified to afford relief to his sufferings." Shulze, supra
note 98, at 543.
192 Declaration of Independence, supra note 184, at 329.
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such Physicians for our relief, as we have most confidence in." 9 3
2. Economic Freedom
References to economic freedom were even more common in the
Thomsonian literature than those to bodily freedom. Before I review these
arguments, it is important to stress that the Jacksonians' support of economic
liberty was tied to their broader vision of political and human liberty. It was not
based merely on a wish to maximize economic efficiency and growth. Moreover,
it bears repeating that unlike many later proponents of the laissez-faire principle,
the Jacksonians emphatically were not impelled by a desire to protect wealthy
individuals and large businesses from the government. To the contrary, their
opposition to economic regulation was directed primarily against "special
legislation," such as the bestowal of monopolies, which promoted the interests of
the affluent and influential rather than the advancing the common good.194
Consequently, when the New York Thomsonians contemplated forming a
third party to push for repeal of the New York medical licensing statute, they
called it the "Anti-Monopoly Party."195 Their bate noir was not simply economic
regulation in the medical field, but regulation used to prop up an aristocratic
monopoly. Similarly, Honestus proclaimed, "The coalision [sic] of the medical
faculty in this state [Ohio], and the protection of that coalision by legislative
patronage, we confidently affirm to be contrary to the letter and spirit of the
constitution."1 9 6
Because they believed that medical licensing was a monopolistic plot by the
medical establishment, the Thomsonians were certain that the medical practice
acts' stated goal of protecting health was mere camouflage for mercenary
motives. This conviction was bolstered by the fact that many states, rather than
prohibiting the unlicensed practice of medicine altogether, merely forbade the
collection of fees by unlicensed doctors or banned suits by them for unpaid
compensation. A New York statute's exemption for freely provided botanical
medical services led The Thomsonian Recorder to quip: "Quacks may kill whom
they please. . . if they do not take any money for the commission of the act."' 97
The battle over medical licensing was thus a quintessential Jacksonian era
conflict, pitting, in Meyers' words, "equality against privilege, liberty against
domination; .. . natural dignity against factitious superiority; ... progress against
193 Petition to the Hon. The Legislature of the State of New Jersey, reprinted in Medical, THE
INDEPENDENCE, Feb. 15, 1832, at 1.
194 See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning
and Origins ofLaissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REv. 293, 314-26 (1985).
195 HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 138.
196 Honestus, supra note 179, at 124.
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dead precedent."' 98 The Thomsonians saw themselves as commonsensical,
empirical, and democratic, in contrast to the pretentious, doctrinaire, and cliquish
regular physicians they struggled against. Whereas the regulars were attempting
to fortify their economic and social position through the establishment of an
artificial monopoly, the Thomsonians were fighting for an open medical services
market in which the price and availability of different therapeutic approaches
would reflect their actual value to patients. According to a Maine senator
advocating the repeal of that state's practice of medicine law, the public
demanded:
[T]hat it will be the judge of its own wants-it will select its own
servants. . . . -that there shall be no bar to competition between
two classes of physicians; but that each individual shall stand or
fall on his own merits-that he who pretends to superior
attainments or endowments, shall support his claims, not by
appealing to his lineage or associations, but by what he
accomplishes.199
The Thomsonians viewed their fight for medical freedom as part of a larger
war being fought by the country's honest, productive citizens against aristocratic
privilege and power. Calling for revocation of the New York practice law, the
Poughkeepsie Thomsonian contended:
Nothing short of such a measure can wrest the reins of
government from the polluted hands of aristocracy, and place its
inhabitants on an equal footing. This step must eventually be
taken, in order to break down that disgusting monopoly which
has long been sapping the very foundations of American
freedom.... Thomsonians are by no means the only class that
suffer from corrupt legislation. Farmers, mechanics, and laborers
in general experience . . . the demoralizing influence of unfair
and unjust speculation, set on foot by the anti-republican nabobs
that infest our country. These drones of community feast and
fatten at the expense of the honest and industrious parts of
society.200
This emphasis on aristocratic conspiracies and class conflict does not mean
that the Thomsonians did not also view the medical licensing statutes as direct
infringements of their individual economic rights. To the contrary, undergirding
198 MEYERS, supra note 157, at 10.
199 Speech ofMr. Smart, 8 BOTANICO-MEDICAL RECORDER 270, 271 (1840).




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 13 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol13/iss1/2
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
the Jacksonian attack against special legislation were fundamental constitutional
norms of economic liberty-namely, a prohibition against the government taking
the property of one citizen and giving it to another and a ban on laws impairing
the obligation of contracts. 20 1 The Jacksonians drew from a constitutional
tradition, most famously embodied in Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase's
1798 Calder v. Bull opinion, that these state actions were violative of "certain
vital principles in our free republican governments" and "contrary to the great
first principles of the social compact," even when not directly forbidden by
particular constitutional language.20 2
When antebellum judges grounded economic rights in specific constitutional
provisions, they relied on state constitutional prohibitions against the deprivation
of property without due process of law, state constitutional bans against the
taking of property without just compensation, and state and federal constitutional
language forbidding laws impairing the obligation of contracts. 20 The
Thomsonians occasionally also referred to such provisions. For example,
Honestus contended that the Ohio medical practice act's prohibition against suits
for fees by unlicensed practitioners violated the state constitutional bar against
laws impairing the validity of contracts.204 The statute did so, he maintained, by
rendering "null and void" any contract "that has been, may or can be made
between the unprivileged physician and his patient." 205
Overall, however, the Thomsonians tended to base the economic liberty
strand of their medical freedom arguments not on the letter of the state and
federal constitutions, but on basic principles of American justice-that is, on the
"thin Constitution" described by Tushnet.206 For example, the editorial titled
"Declaration of Independence" invoked general free labor and free contract
notions in remarking:
Our tradesmen and mechanics are permitted and encouraged to
hire themselves for what they can earn, and to bring forward the
201 See Benedict, supra note 194, at 321-23.
202 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.). Among the legislative actions that
Chase contended were prohibited were "a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts
of citizens" and "a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B." Id.
203 See Benedict, supra note 194, at 324-26; Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort:
The Remedial Revolution Nineteenth-Century in State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV.
57 (1999). The federal "Contracts Clause" is at U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10. The due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment was originally not deemed to restrain the actions of state govemments-a
problem that was remedied by the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which had its own
due process clause, in 1868. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment was similarly deemed not to apply to actions of states until 1897, when the Supreme
Court applied it to the states through incorporation into the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
204 OHIO CONST.of 1802, art. VIII, § 16.
205 Honestus, supra note 179, at 131.
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fruits of their labor and sell them for what they are worth,
without being questioned where, with whom, or how long they
served as apprentices.... So should it be with the doctor.207
A proposed petition to the New York legislature, presented in the voice of
patients, contended: "It is one of the privileges of an independent people to pay
their money to whom they please, and for what they please, without the direct or
indirect interference of any one." 208
In this "thin constitutional" mode, the Thomsonians sometimes combined
their arguments regarding economic freedom with appeals to bodily freedom. For
instance, an editorial in a New York botanical newspaper, attacking the state's
prohibition against compensation for unlicensed practitioners, explicitly linked
the law's tyrannical economic coercion against unlicensed practitioners with an
equally oppressive bodily coercion against patients.
Here we are gravely told by law that we shall not command our
own property. If A. employs B. because he is a skilful [sic]
practitioner, C. steps in and says if A. pays B. any thing [sic] for
his services he will have B. fined and imprisoned for taking it. C.
therefore commands the will and purse of A. and prevents B.
from doing the service that A. must have done in order to save
his life. But B. in consequence of being jeopardized both in his
"life, liberty and property," and having a family to support, must
go into other business, thereby throwing the sick man, or A. and
his property into the power of a set of men in whom he has no
confidence, or he must go without a doctor until he will come to
the terms that are dictated to him, and be poisoned "Secundum
Artem" [according to the accepted practice of the profession],
and according to law.209
This paragraph illustrates how the different aspects of medical freedom in
the Thomsonian literature were sometimes almost inextricably intertwined. The
next strand of medical freedom that I will discuss-freedom of inquiry-
similarly cannot be viewed in isolation from the other strands.
207 Declaration of Independence, supra note 184, at 327.
208 Memorial to the Honorable the Legislature of the State of New York, I BOTANIC
WATCHMAN 82 (1834). This was a draft petition offered by the editor of the Botanic Watchman for
consideration by the Botanic Society of the State of New York. The petition ultimately
promulgated by the Society is discussed in detail infra Section IlI.F.
209 The Medical Pension Bill, I BOTANIC WATCHMAN 57 (1834) (emphasis in original).
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3. Freedom ofInquiry
The Thomsonians directed their anti-monopoly arguments not only at regular
physicians' attempts to control the market for medical fees, but also at their
efforts to control the marketplace of medical ideas. Like Benjamin Rush, the
Thomsonians railed against the orthodox medical establishment's squelching of
competing systems of medical knowledge and understanding.
Opponents of medical licensing invoked the general right of free inquiry as a
necessary feature of a free and democratic society. For example, New York
Senator Scott, in a report advocating repeal of that state's medical licensing
statute, declared, "A people accustomed to govern themselves, and boasting of
their intelligence, are impatient of restraint. They want no protection but freedom
of inquiry and freedom of action."2 10 The Thomsonian essayist Honestus
maintained:
Learning and property are the elements of political power. These
elements combined and put in operation, are the most efficient
means for the elevation of the few and the subjugation of the
many. . . . This monopolizing spirit constitutes . . . a literary
aristocracy, a privileged order, whose ends and aims have been,
are now, and ever will be hostile to the equal and unalienable
nghts and privileges of society at large.2 1'
These statements demonstrate that the Thomsonians considered free inquiry
to be essential for equality and political liberty. Importantly, they also deemed it
necessary for intellectual progress. Honestus lamented the fact that, although
"[w]e live in an enlightened era" marked by "the progress of science and the
march of mind," the elite "renounce the demonstrations of reason, received from
honest inquiry, devoutly idolize antiquated traditions, and in philosophy,
medicine, and their kindred sciences adhere ... pertinaciously . .. to the impress
of superstition." 2 12 To buttress his contention that open inquiry advanced the
attainment of truth, Honestus stressed a theme that would reverberate throughout
the history of American medical liberty advocacy-the incompleteness and
imperfection of present scientific knowledge. Honestus maintained that because
of "the defective limitedness and imperfection of human intellect," many
210 Quoted in Coventry, supra note 130, at 160. In this same spirit, the Recorder published a
paean to "Liberty of the Press," which argued that truth would emerge from the clash of ideas. "Let
then opinion meet opinion on all grounds of debate and controversy.-Let system combat system,
and theory wrestle with theory. Let the Press work on with all its activity; throw not over it a single
fetter. Who says that truth is powerless and cannot prevail? She must prevail." The Liberty of the
Press, 1 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 477, 479 (1832).
211 Honestus, supra note 179, at 123.
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supposedly established "facts and demonstrations . . . lie open for free enquiry
[sic] and the most ample discussion."213 Freedom of inquiry was necessary, he
explained, "not because there are no fixed immutable principles, relations and
dependencies . . . existing inherently in the nature and fitness of things," but
because "these relations, connections and dependencies have never been
perfectly understood, and therefore never fully developed by the boldest
researches of science and time." 2 14
Consistent with their egalitarian Jacksonian world view, the Thomsonians
frequently proclaimed that if people of all classes were liberated to exercise their
natural genius, common folk would be at least as likely as book-trained
physicians to advance medical knowledge.215 Freedom of inquiry, if extended to
ordinary citizens, would propel progress by emancipating medicine from the
university-trained elite doctors' stagnant, superstition-tainted orthodoxy. In a
Georgia Senate debate on a bill that would revise the state medical practice act so
as to permit botanical physicians to charge for their services, Senator Norbom B.
Powell declared: "I feel unwilling to fetter the human mind, to bind men by law
to any particular system of physic. Such a course must curtail the range of human
intellect. Have not some of the most important discoveries in science been made
by those in the humblest walks of life?" 216 In response to this rhetorical question,
Powell pointed to the contributions that the "illiterate dairy-women of England,"
the "unlettered Indians of Peru," and the "cannibals of Brazil" had made to
medicine by discovering the therapeutic qualities of cowpox matter, cinchona
bark, and ipecac, respectively.217
In the Thomsonian literature, such celebrations of common people's
achievements usually presumed not that the unschooled masses possessed great
intellectual sophistication, but rather that medicine was an uncomplicated
discipline that did not demand much brainpower. A Maryland legislative
committee observed, "Of all sciences, the knowledge of disease and the means of
cure, must be supposed . . . as most simple and easy of attainment. It is,
essentially, a science of experience." 2 18 When medicine was viewed in this way,
the "free inquiry" required for its progress was not complex scientific analysis,
but simple practical experimentation, uncorrupted by abstract theory. Samuel
Thomson himself, in an autobiography written in the third person, remarked:
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 See WHORTON, NATURE CURES, supra note 29, at 40 ("The whole wide expanse of
Thomsonian publications ... fairly dripped with folksy egalitarianism.").
216 Legislature of Georgia. Equal Rights, 5 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 136, 137 (1837).
217 Id. All three of these therapies were, by the late 1830s, part of the orthodox materia
medica. "Cowpox matter" was used for smallpox vaccination, cinchona bark (from which quinine
was derived) for malaria and fever, and ipecac as an emetic.
218 Maryland Legislature, 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 188, 188 (1834).
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Dr. Thomson ... had nothing to guide him but his own
experience. He not having had an education, has received no
advantages from reading books, which left his mind unshackled
by the visionary theories and opinions of others; his whole
studies have been in the great book of nature, and his
conclusions have all been drawn from that unerring guide; by
this he was enabled to form correct opinions of the fitness of
things.219
As discussed previously, 2 20 Samuel Thomson was not himself actually a
paragon of free inquiry, at least later in his life. Committed to protecting the
purity of his system, he increasingly condemned explorations into improved or
supplemental therapies as "mongrelism." 2 2 1 But the increasingly dominant Curtis
and his Independents were deeply devoted to free inquiry; indeed, their schism
from the purists was based in large part on their commitment to this ideal.222 The
Independent Thomsonians opened the pages of their journals and the curricula of
their classrooms to both conventional science and other alternative medical
systems of the era, including Grahamism, Mesmerism, phrenology, and
hydropathy. 223 In 1837, Curtis defended his Botanico-Medical College of Ohio
from the purists' attacks by boasting, "We have given the utmost freedom and
latitude to inquiry, cheerfully confessed our ignorance where we felt it, and
advised submission to nothing but demonstration by the best evidences that the
nature of the cases would admit."224
219 THOMSON, supra note 108, at 8-10. Although the preface is written "By a Friend," Haller
ascribes it to Thomson himself. HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 50.
220 Supra text accompanying notes 147-151.
221 HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 180.
222 Id. at 163-67.
223 Id. at 201-02, 232-33. Later in his own life, Curtis also became somewhat doctrinaire and
intolerant of dissension. He resisted merger with the Eclectics and circulated his own purity pledge.
Id. at 248. He eventually even supported the licensing of educated botanical physicians. WHORTON,
NATURE CURES, supra note 29, at 46.
224 Medical Organizations, 5 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 236, 236 (1837). As another sign of
his commitment to free inquiry, Curtis proposed using surplus federal revenues to create something
like today's National Institutes of Health, although this entity would have rewarded completed
discoveries instead of funding proposed research. Alva Curtis, Quackery Again, 5 THOMSONIAN
RECORDER 91 (1836). Seeking a "constitutional use" for the federal surplus-"that is, an
appropriation by which it should be made to benefit equally, all the citizens of the Republic,"
Curtis drafted a petition to Congress suggesting the creation of a permanent fund that would be
used to grant "rewards or premiums to discoverers of useful truths in science, and the inventors of
useful means and processes in the arts that are calculated to render the advantages of those
scientific truths or principles, profitable to the community." The distribution of prizes would have
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4. Freedom of Conscience/Religion
Finally, the Thomsonians' medical liberty arguments also invoked the
principle of freedom of conscience. For example, in his essay, Honestus
proclaimed himself "conscientiously opposed" to orthodox medicine and then
rhetorically queried:
Might I not with equal propriety, and with equal justice, be
compelled to attend at, or to erect and support certain places of
worship, or maintain a patented clergy, either Papal or Protestant
without my consent and against my conscience, as to be
compelled to employ a physician of a certain class, contrary to
my best judgment, and utterly against my will?225
It is difficult to determine exactly what the Thomsonians meant when they
asserted that the American value of "freedom of conscience" demanded freedom
of therapeutic choice. On the one hand, they may have believed that this term
was synonymous with freedom of religion-and thus that a person's choice of
health practitioner was in some way an exercise of religion. On the other hand,
they may have believed that medical freedom and freedom of religion were
distinct, though analogous, concepts under a broader umbrella of "freedom of
conscience."22 6 Both are possible. Dictionaries of the time did not limit the word
conscience to religious belief. For example, Webster's American Dictionary of
1828 defined the word as, "Internal or self-knowledge, or judgment of right and
wrong; or the faculty, power or principle within us, which decides on the
lawfulness or unlawfulness of our own actions and affections, and instantly
approves or condemns them." 227 But as Michael McConnell has observed, in the
early years of the United States, "outside of dictionaries, the vast preponderance
of references to 'liberty of conscience' . . . were either expressly or impliedly
- - ,,228limited to religious conscience.
At times, the Thomsonians emphasized freedom of opinion and belief in the
more expansive sense. A letter to the Thomsonian Recorder proclaimed:
"Legislatures may enact laws against Thomsonianism, but, thank heaven, they
cannot bind the mind of man. . . . For freedom of thought and speech are the
225 Honestus, supra note 179, at 130-31.
226 The best discussion of the relationship between the terms "free exercise of religion" and
"freedom of conscience" is Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise ofReligion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1488-1500 (1990).
227 WEBSTER'S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), available at
http://1828.mshaffer.com/. For discussion of other early dictionary definitions of conscience, see
McConnell, supra note 226, at 1493.
228 McConnell, supra note 226, at 1493.
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unalienable rights of man." 229 Honestus implored, "In this land of freedom ...
shall we not as a free, magnanimous and independent people, dare to think and
act for ourselves, to assume our proper rank and dignity in the scale of being
?,,230
But the Thomsonians-echoing Rush and Jefferson before them-usually
linked their invocations of freedom of "conscience" or "thought" directly or
indirectly to religious liberty. 231 For example, Honestus, immediately following
the statement quoted above, urged the people to "shake off the reckless
aspirations of a clerical, legal, and medical denomination, that invades our rights
and holds them in contempt." 23 2 Thomsonians frequently compared orthodox
medicine to an established church and equated the right to choose a physician
with the right to choose a minister. For instance, an unsigned editorial in the
Thomsonian Recorder declared: "[W]e could never see what right any man, or
any body of men, can have in the nature and fitness of things to control us in our
choice of a lawyer, preacher or physician."233 Samuel Thomson himself opened
the introduction to his magnum opus by equating the orthodox physicians of his
own day to the priests of ages past, who "held the things of religion in their own
hands, and brought the people to their terms."234
As one scholar has observed, although "little in [Thomsonianism] could be
called overtly or distinctively religious," it nonetheless "had deep roots in the
Second Great Awakening, which accentuated the role of humans in effecting the
Kingdom of God on earth."235 The Thomsonians sometimes strengthened the
association between medicine and religion by suggesting that the "natural"
botanical remedies of their system were divinely sanctioned. The very first page
of the first issue of the Thomsonian Recorder claimed a divine foundation for the
Thomsonian system, bemoaning the persecution of any practitioner "who dares
to remove disease with healing medicine, which the God of Nature has so
profusely scattered for the benefit of all."236 The previously mentioned New
Jersey petition similarly declared:
229 B. W. S., A Second Voice from New York, 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 252 (1834).
230 Honestus, supra note 179, at 123.
231 One potential problem for the Thomsonians in relying on "freedom of conscience" is that,
compared to "free exercise of religion" (the phrase chosen by the drafters of the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution over James Madison's proposed "rights of conscience"), "freedom of
conscience" less clearly encompasses liberty of action as well as of belief. McConnell, supra note
226, at 1488-90. See also U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Unsurprisingly, though, Thomsonians insisted on
their right to act on their medical opinions, not merely to hold them.
232 Honestus, supra note 179, at 123.
233 Untitled Editorial 1, 2 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 246 (1834).
234 THOMSON, NEW GUIDE TO HEALTH, supra note 108, at 5.
235 ROBERT C. FULLER, ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE AND AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIFE 34, 36 (1989).
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As we believe, the God of Nature has bountifully caused to grow
in our own country, and placed within our reach, medicines for
the alleviation and cure of the various maladies with which we
are from time to time afflicted; and we conceive it an infraction
of our rights to debar us from the use of such remedies, or from
employing such physicians as administer them. 23 7
After the Civil War, when groups with more explicitly spiritual agendas
assumed the role of leading advocates for medical freedom, the association
between medical and religious liberty became stronger and stronger until, in the
early twentieth century, Christian Scientists began regularly to cite constitutional
religion clauses both inside and outside court.23 8 By contrast, I have found no
instance in which a Thomsonian-era commentator directly contended that a
medical licensing statute violated a particular religion clause in a state
constitution.239 Nonetheless, the link between medical and religious choice was
so close that when the Arkansas territorial governor vetoed a medical practice
law in 1831, he asserted in his veto message that government should not control a
240citizen's "will and faith" on the subject of the choice of medical practitioners.
F. The Battle in New York
The Thomsonians' popular constitutionalist articulation of medical freedom,
with its four contributing strands, achieved its greatest triumph in 1844, with the
revocation of the medical practice law of New York, the nation's most populous
state.
New York had had a medical licensing statute on the books since colonial
times, and the legislature had ratcheted up the penalties until, by 1827,
unlicensed practitioners were subject to fines and imprisonment, at least in
theory.241 The Thomsonians' campaign for medical liberty in New York
commenced in the late 1820s, when they conducted a statewide petition
237 Petition, supra note 193, at 1. Thomson himself stated that his medical system and its
cures derived from "the God of nature." THOMSON, NEw GUIDE TO HEALTH, supra note 108, at 16,
86.
238 See, e.g., RENNIE B. SCHOEPFLIN, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE ON TRIAL 156 (2003); Margery Fox,
Conflict to Coexistence: Christian Science and Medicine, 8 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY 292, 296 (1984).
In an unpublished draft manuscript (available on request), I examine in detail the relationship
between medical freedom and religious freedom and the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century. Grossman, You Can Choose Your Medicine, supra note 7.
239 The free exercise clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution was not
deemed to apply to the states by incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment until 1940. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
240 The Governor's Veto, ARKANSAS GAZETTE, Nov. 9, 1831, at 1.
241 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, PASSED AT THE SECOND MEETING OF THE 50TH SESSION
OF THE LEGISLATURE Title VII, § 22 (1827); HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORs, supra note 3, at
134-35; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 338 app. 11.
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campaign that persuaded the legislature, in 1830, to exempt from the licensing
requirement any person "using or applying, for the benefit of any sick person,
any roots, barks, or herbs, the growth or produce of the United States."242 Four
years later, however, the regulars persuaded the legislature to repeal this
exemption for botanical practitioners, although the 1834 amended statute allowed
botanical doctors to perform their services "without fee or reward."243 Thus
commenced a decade-long crusade, led by the Thomsonians, to revoke the state's
medical practice statute altogether.
In September 1834, the New York Botanic State Convention, comprising
delegates from local botanic societies throughout the state, launched a campaign
against the revised medical practice law. As described by the editor of the
Botanic Watchman:
A spirit of unanimity pervaded the convention in all its
deliberations, and as they felt the weight of their oppression, they
were unanimously resolved to apply at the source of evil [the
legislature] for a redress of their grievances, and a mitigation of
the abuses, that have been unwarrantably heaped upon them,
until the right of a free selection of their favorite physician, is
left unfettered by legal restraint. If every state in the Union
would pursue a similar course, we might ere long, throw off the
shackles of despotism, which the lordly faculty are endavoring
[sic] to make fast, until the people are entirely lost to a sense of
their freedom, and the right to exercise their constitutional
privileges. 244
The convention appointed two committees, one to draft a petition for repeal
of the medical practice law and another to write resolutions expressing the views
of the convention. 24 5 The resulting documents, discussed in detail below, are
notable both for their explicit invocation of the Constitution and for their
reference to all of the strands of medical freedom discussed above.24 6
The convention ordered the printing of one thousand copies of the resolutions
and five hundred copies of the petition.24 7 In February 1835, the Thomsonian
Recorder reported that "[p]etitions are pouring in to the Capitol from every
242 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, PASSED AT THE 53RD SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE
126, § 2 (1830).
243 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, PASSED AT THE 57TH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE 68,
§2 (1834).
244 The Botanic State Convention, I BOTANIC WATCHMAN 145 (1834).
245 Proceedings of the Botanic State Convention, 3 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 17, 18 (1834).
Both five-man committees included Samuel Thomson's son, John. Id. at 18.
246 See infra Section III.E.
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portion of the Empire State,"248 and three months later the same publication
claimed that the number of petitioners had "swelled to 40,000.",249 A revocation
bill passed the House, but lost in the Senate. 25 0 The Thomsonians nevertheless
energetically continued their petition campaign; on one occasion Samuel
Thomson's son, John, paraded into Albany pushing a wheelbarrow containing a
petition with so many signatures that it stretched to thirty-one yards. 251 The
petitioners obtained the same disappointing result (passage in the House, defeat
12in the Senate) three additional times before they achieved total victory. In
1844, the legislature finally repealed the New York medical practice statute and
enacted a law explicitly stating: "No person shall be liable to any criminal
prosecution or to indictment, for practising physic and surgery without license,
excepting in cases of mal-practice, or gross ignorance, or immoral conduct in
such practice."253
An examination of the 1834 petition and resolutions demonstrates that the
New York Thomsonians viewed themselves as vindicating fundamental
constitutional principles. The petition declared, "[W]e believe said law is a direct
infringement of our constitutional privileges."2 54 The resolutions presented the
Botanic Convention's mission as the prevention of the usurpation of New York
citizens' constitutional rights and privileges by an unholy alliance of orthodox
physicians and legislators. The resolutions' introduction characterized those
legislators who supported medical licensing as "traitors to their constituents, and
assassins to the principles of a liberal and just government."2 55 It continued,
"Upon such men should not the mark of disapprobation be branded, so plainly as
to warn all others from encroaching in like manner upon our constitutional
rights?"256
In detailing which of their rights the despised statute invaded, the convention
members used every libertarian argument in the Jacksonian arsenal. Because the
1834 New York law did not prohibit botanical practitioners from administering
their remedies to patients, but only from receiving compensation, the petition and
resolutions paid special attention to the idea of economic freedom. Indeed, the
petition-a much shorter document than the resolutions, and focused especially
on the ban on compensation-rested almost exclusively on principles of free
contract and free labor. First, the petition declared from the perspective of
248 Untitled Editorial, 3 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 159, 160 (1835).
249 Untitled Editorial, 3 THOMSONIAN RECORDER 253, 253 (1835).
250 HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 137.
251 WHORTON, NATURE CURES, supra note 29, at 36; YOUNG, supra note 115, at 55.
252 HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 137-38.
253 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, PASSED AT THE SIXTY-SEVENTH SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE 406 § 3 (1844) (Ch. 275: An Act in relation to the practice of Physic and Surgery,
passed May 6, 1844); see also HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 138.
254 Proceedings of the Botanic State Convention, supra note 245, at 18.
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patients:
We have a right, beyond doubt, to employ any person whom we
may think proper, as our physician, without jeopardizing his life,
liberty or property. If we employ a person to administer to us as
our physician, common law and justice should give him a
reasonable compensation for his services.2 57
Assuming the voice of practitioners, the petition then asserted: "In all matters of
business, we have a right to manage our own affairs, and that right we wish to
exercise unmolested by those who may make it their interest to thwart and
perplex us in our just and legal avocations." 258
The resolutions echoed these themes, asserting, for example, that law should
"leav[e] all professions to stand or fall by their own merits, regulated by a fair
competition, and an accountability to their employers." 25 9 But the committee on
resolutions also set its advocacy for the economic strand of medical freedom
within a broader, typically Jacksonian attack on corrupt special legislation
favoring the economic aristocracy. Although the resolutions vigorously attacked
the legislators who supported the medical practice law, the committee's primary
villains were the "medical men," who had captured the legislative process to
"invade in an unjust manner [our] rights and privileges."260 One resolution
declared that the law "was obtained through the influence of a designing faculty,
and expressly calculated to force a monopoly of practice into their own hands by
the exclusion of all others." 2 6 1 Another pledged, "[W]e will use all laudable
endeavors to counteract the influence of all medical monopolies in the halls of
Legislation, and to produce an equalized system of practice, resting on its
respective merits."262
The New York Thomsonians' arguments were not solely economic, however.
They also asserted a right to control one's body and the treatment of it:
We are all sensitive beings, both in mind and body, and it is to
protect these functions from insult and injury, that we object to
the [law]. If we are distressed in body, what greater privilege can
we enjoy than the free and independent right in the selection of
our Physicians to relieve our maladies? 263
257 Id. at 18.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 19.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 20.
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The resolutions proclaimed that the right to employ one's choice of physician
was part of the "blood-bought freedom of our venerable sires, which was
purchased by them on the field of battle for their posterity."264 The committee on
resolutions bolstered its argument for bodily freedom by reference to the dangers
of heroic orthodox medicine. "[I]t were better to have no laws regulating the
practice of medicine, than to place all power in the hands of a privileged few, and
those using the most dangerous poisons for medicine."265
In the resolutions, the Thomsonians also invoked the parallel between
medical freedom and religious freedom. "If our minds are diseased, who would
have the audacity to dictate to us our spiritual Physician: would we not all of us
consider ourselves fully competent to select the Physician for our souls as well as
bodies?",266 This argument proved to be persuasive to the legislative committee
considering repeal measures, which, in supporting the petitioners, remarked,
"Men cannot be legislated out of one religion and into another." 2 6 7
Finally, although the resolutions did not greatly emphasize freedom of
inquiry, they did allude to the merits of "unshackled" science.268 The committee
that drafted the resolutions, like Thomsonian commentators generally, embraced
a populist empirical vision of medical science, in which therapeutic systems are
"tested by experience" and any law restricting free access to different types of
practitioners unfairly "charges the people with ignorance, and infringes on their
rights." 269
In short, the documents emerging from the 1834 New York Botanic
Convention epitomize the Thomsonians' multidimensional view of medical
rights as constitutional rights. Moreover, the tactics used by the Thomsonians in
New York exemplify how medical freedom advocates, like others in Jacksonian
America, did not treat courts as the only forum, or even the preferred forum, for
asserting constitutional rights. Finally, the result of these struggles demonstrates
that such extrajudicial constitutional campaigns could be astonishingly
successful.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Independent Thomsonians continued to exist, under a series of different
names, until the early years of the twentieth century. 270 After the revocation of
264 Id.
265 Id. at 20.
266 Id. at 19.
267 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 145 (quoting "Report of Minority of Select Committee" and
"Report of the Select Committee ... Jan. 30, 1841," Transactions of the Medical Society of the
State of New York 241, 243-44, 265, 268 (1841)).
268 Proceedings of the Botanic State Convention, supra note 245, at 19.
269 Id. at 20.
270 The Independent Thomsonians changed their name first to Botanic-Medicals and then,
after 1850, to Physio-Medicals.
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most of the medical licensing statutes by the mid-1800s, however, there was a
discernible change of character in the group. They lost their grass-roots, popular
fervor (and much of their following) and assumed all the trappings of orthodox
medicine, including state medical societies and a small network of diploma-
granting medical schools. 2 7 1 Meanwhile, the purist Thomsonian faction shriveled
away and disappeared following the dissolution of the United States Thomsonian
Society in 1840 and the founder's death in 1843.272 During the second half of the
nineteenth century, botanical medicine proponents who traced their roots back to
Samuel Thomson transformed from a "remarkable socio-medical movement" to
"a small, ineffectual, and pseudo-scientific cult." 27 3
Nevertheless, other botanical systems continued to prosper through the
1800s. 2 74 Moreover, botanical medicine was just the first in a long list of popular
non-orthodox medical approaches that would emerge over the course of the
century. In 1893, Henry Wood listed the various types of "irregulars" he was
familiar with: "the homeopathists, eclectics, hydropathists, magnetic, electric,
and 'biochenic' practitioners, Thomsonians, hygienists, metaphysicians,
Christian scientists, mental healers, hypnotists, clairvoyants, mediumistic healers,
faith curists, gospel healers, and members of the Christian Alliance." 27 5 in
subsequent decades, these alternative systems would be joined by others,
including osteopathy, chiropractic, and naturopathy. Indeed, alternative medicine
movements continued to arise throughout the twentieth century, and they remain
an important aspect of the American medical scene today.276 While these
different systems have produced a kaleidoscope of theories and philosophies,
they have all tended to embrace the same cluster of attitudes: skepticism toward
orthodox medical science, an embrace of more "natural" and lower-risk
alternatives to regular drugs, and, in many instances, a populist suspicion of
nefarious conspiracies involving the medical elite.
271 See Berman, supra note 2, at 133, 139-42.
272 See HALLER, THE PEOPLE'S DOCTORS, supra note 3, at 180, 184-86. The remnants of the
Thomsonian purists sought accommodation with the Independents after Thomson's passing. See id.
at 187.
273 See Berman, supra note 2, at 135.
274 See William G. Rothstein, The Botanical Movements and Orthodox Medicine, in OTHER
HEALERS: UNORTHODOX MEDICINE IN AMERICA 29, 47-50 (Norman Gevitz ed., 1988); James C.
Whorton, From Cultism to CAM: Alternative Medicine in the Twentieth Century, in THE POLITICS
OF HEALING: HISTORIES OF ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORTH AMERICA 287,
288 (Robert D. Johnston ed., 2004). Before the Civil War, a botanical practitioner named Wooster
Beach founded another branch of botanical medicine that came to be known as the "eclectics."
Eventually, many Independent Thomsonian schools and practitioners convened to eclecticism, and
the eclectics became (along with the regulars and the homeopaths) one of the three major organized
medical sects during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Id.
275 Henry Wood, Medical Slavery Through Legislation, 8 ARENA 680, 687 (1893).
276 See generally OTHER HEALERS, supra note 274; THE POLITICS OF HEALING, supra note 274;
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As I explore in a separate piece,277 a second wave of medical licensing arose
after the Civil War, as did a corresponding revival of medical freedom literature.
By 1901, every state and the District of Columbia had a medical licensing system
of some sort.278 These new licensing regimes generally mandated more rigorous
qualifications for medical practice and imposed more severe penalties on
violators than did their antebellum counterparts. 2 79 The opponents of post-Civil
War medical licensing were more likely than their early American forerunners to
pursue constitutional challenges in court, but these challenges were almost
invariably unsuccessful. Their litigation strategy suffered its severest blow in
1888, with the Supreme Court's upholding of a state licensing law in Dent v.
West Virginia.280
Nevertheless, the almost universal adoption of medical licensing during the
Gilded Age did not represent the demise of a widespread ethos in favor of
freedom of therapeutic choice. During this later period, Americans increasingly
recognized the benefits of professional expertise and thus embraced licensing
systems designed to ensure that medical practitioners were sufficiently educated
and trained. 2 8 1 But there was still broad consensus that government should not
discriminate against or in favor of different systems of medicine. This continuing
commitment to freedom of therapeutic choice is evidenced by the content of the
state medical practice acts themselves, 282 by enforcement patterns and jury
277 Grossman, You Can Choose Your Medicine, supra note 7.
278 STARR, supra note 43, at 104.
279 See Medical Practice Laws, 3 AM. MED. ASS'N BULL. 34, 103 (1907) (describing post-
Civil War medical practice laws in each state).
280 129 U.S. 114 (1889). Dent was a West Virginia eclectic practitioner practicing without a
license. The only version of "freedom" that he expressly fought for in this case was his own
freedom to practice his trade and preserve his vested property interests in his profession under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Supreme Court's opinion, Justice Stephen
Field emphatically reaffirmed the existence of the "right of every citizen of the United States to
follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose." Id. at 121. He nonetheless
upheld the constitutionality of medical licensing, observing: "Few professions require more careful
preparation by one who seeks to enter it than that of medicine." Id. at 122. As I argue elsewhere,
the fact that Field in this case upheld a licensing statute mandating a medical diploma from a
reputable school does not mean that he would have upheld a discriminatory statute that accepted
diplomas only from orthodox medical schools and not from their homeopathic and eclectic
counterparts. See Grossman, You Can Choose Your Medicine, supra note 7.
281 See Samuel Lee Baker, Medical Licensing in America: An Early Liberal Reform S-6, 12
(1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with Yale Library); Grossman,
You Can Choose Your Medicine, supra note 7.
282 Most of the second wave statutes explicitly preserved the rights of at least some
alternative practitioners, if adequately educated, and they routinely included homeopaths and
eclectic doctors in the administration of the licensing regimes. Moreover, some of these laws
included explicit nondiscrimination clauses. See Medical Practice Laws, supra note 279 (offering a
comprehensive review of the medical practice laws of every state as of 1907). Finally, these
medical practice acts frequently exempted various types of drugless practitioners from their
requirements altogether. See id. at 107.
129
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behavior;283 and by petition campaigns, mobbed legislative hearings, the
formation of advocacy organizations, and the promulgation of medical freedom
literature.284
As was the case before the Civil War, efforts to preserve medical freedom
during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era were largely the product of organized
movements by alternative practitioners and their supporters. These later
opponents of discriminatory medical licensing-many of whom were intimately
familiar with the Thomsonians' own struggle-inherited their predecessors' "thin
constitutional" arguments as well as their articulation of the four strands of
medical freedom identified in this Article. This is not to say that there were no
differences in emphasis in the battle against the second wave of medical
licensing. For example, arguments regarding the link between freedom of inquiry
and medical progress assumed a more prominent-and sometimes dominant-
role in the later rhetoric. 2 85 The rise of drugless therapies, such as Mind Cure and
Christian Science, with spiritual and religious foundations, brought greater focus
on the association between medical freedom and religious freedom. And because
many of the dominant postbellum alternative medical movements were favored
by the middle class and elites, much of the medical freedom literature lost the
populist tone of the Thomsonian arguments. Nonetheless, the Thomsonians'
lasting influence on the medical freedom rhetoric was unmistakable.2 86
The inexorable rise of effective scientific medicine and "wonder drugs" in
the early twentieth century posed a serious challenge to alternative medicine.
Nevertheless, interest in and use of alternative remedies have soared since the
1960s.287 A notable feature of the story of American alternative medicine during
283 Prosecutors and juries widely refused to prosecute or convict unorthodox practitioners
during this era. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 310. James C. Whorton contends that these second
wave medical licensing statutes were "applied more seriously" than the antebellum versions and
that "hundreds, if not thousands, of irregular practitioners were fined and/or jailed for unlicensed
practice." Whorton, From Cultism to CAM, supra note 274, at 293, 294. However, evidence
suggests that these laws were rarely enforced by prosecutors and that defendants were rarely
convicted by juries. See Samuel Lee Baker, Medical Licensing in America, supra note 281, at 183-
84 (discussing the lack of enforcement of medical practice acts in the 1870s and 1880s); FREDERICK
R. GREEN, STATE REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 23 (1917) ("I venture to assert that
there is not a single state in the Union today in which the medical practice act prevents any except
the most flagrant quacks and charlatans from carrying on their business unmolested.").
284 Grossman, You Can Choose Your Medicine, supra note 7.
285 The most prominent and influential example of a Gilded Age argument for medical
freedom based primarily on freedom of inquiry was William James' testimony in an 1898
legislative hearing against the application of the Massachusetts medical licensing law to mind
curers. WILLIAM JAMES, THE WORKS OF WILLIAM JAMES: ESSAYS, COMMENTS, AND REVIEWS 56
(1987).
286 Notably, the Thomsonians' anti-monopoly theme would remain prevalent in the anti-
medical licensing literature well into the twentieth century, when medical freedom advocates
frequently leveled antitrust arguments against perceived machinations of the American Medical
Association.
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the past half century has been the remarkable ability of its supporters-primarily
outside of court-to thwart attempts by the government (frequently backed by
organized medicine and the pharmaceutical industry) to restrict access to
alternative practitioners and products.288 Modern campaigns for medical freedom
outside of orthodox medicine, though often led by financially-interested
alternative medicine practitioners and manufacturers, are regularly bolstered by
massive outpourings of popular support.289 Moreover, the rhetoric supporting
these campaigns bears many similarities to the antebellum struggle against
medical licensing, including "thin constitutional" claims of individual rights,
populist rages against unholy alliances between government and the medical
establishment, and multidimensional freedom arguments invoking not only
bodily liberty, but also economic freedom and freedom of conscience and
religion.2 90
A related, but largely distinct, trend has been the emergence in the past four
decades of movements for freedom within orthodox medicine. These movements
have often taken the shape of campaigns by the terminally ill and their
proponents for access to drugs that the FDA has either not yet approved or has
rejected. 29 1 Because the pharmaceutical products sought by these drives are
developed by profitable corporations using modem scientific techniques (often
with the support of government grants), movements for access to these drugs
have largely lacked the populist passion, religious overtones, and "natural rights"
KLUWER HEALTH UPTODATE (Sept. 25, 2005), http://www.uptodate.com/contents/overview-of-
herbal-medicine-and-dietary-supplements# H4 ("In the US, use of herbal medicine declined in the
early 1900s only to experience a resurgence beginning in the 1960's that was part of a larger
movement towards using natural nonconventional approaches to healthcare."); David M. Eisenberg
et al., Trends in Alternative Medicine Use in the United States, 1990-1997, 280 JAMA 1569 (1998)
(reporting surge in use).
288 See generally Whorton, From Cultism to CAM, supra note 274. Indeed, alternative
medicine has achieved a striking degree of positive government recognition, with the establishment
in 1992 of the Office of Alternative Medicine (now called the National Center for Complementary
and Alternative Medicine) at the National Institutes for Health.
289 For example, in the early 1990s, when the public perceived the FDA as threatening the
availability of dietary supplements, Congress reportedly received more mail on this issue than on
any other that session-including health care reform. See John Schwartz, Next Week, FDA Will
Take Vitamins; Lawmakers Get Avalanche of Letters About Agency's Regulation of Dietary
Supplements, WASH. PosT, Dec. 7, 1993, at A23; Editorial, Vitamin Cease-Fire, WASH. POST, Oct.
20, 1994, at A20.
290 For a variety of discussions of these trends, see WHORTON, NATURE CURES, supra note 29,
at 141-307; and the excellent collection of essays in THE POLITICS OF HEALING, supra note 274.
291 However, these campaigns have not been limited to those suffering from fatal diseases
like cancer and AIDS. For example, in response to impassioned protests by sufferers of irritable
bowel syndrome, the FDA in 2002 permitted the return to the market of Lotronex, a drug earlier
withdrawn because of occasional severe side effects. Denise Grady, U.S. Lets Drug Tied to Deaths
Back on Market, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2002) , http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/08/us/us-lets-drug
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rhetoric of the alternative movements. But this may be changing, as disease
groups increasingly express anti-statist outrage and invoke constitutional
principles in favor of their cause. For example, a petition recently circulated by
Freedom of Access to Medicine, an organization dedicated to preserving breast
cancer patients' access to the drug Avastin, concludes:
We are a civilized society that values life. We also cherish
individual freedom and the right of a patient to choose her
medical options with her physician. By acting on this, you will
confirm our belief that Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness
is an inalienable right for all, including the seriously ill. 2 92
Although such patient advocacy groups ordinarily emphasize bodily liberty,
they are often backed by groups and publications that also advocate economic
freedom and minimalist government more generally. 293 Most recently, the
libertarian battle against state interference with freedom of therapeutic choice has
paradoxically manifested itself in the context of government-reimbursed health
care, with cries of "Death Panels!" directed at every hint or apparition of a
limitation on Medicare coverage.294
292 Petition to Protect the Avastin Women, FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO MEDICINES,
http://fameds.org/petition.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
293 See, e.g., Michael F. Cannon, Why Should Politicians and Bureaucrats Decide Whether
Breast-Cancer Patients Can Take Avastin?, CATO@LIBERTY (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.cato-at-
liberty.org/why-should-politicians-and-bureaucrats-decide-whether-breast-cancer-patients-can-
take-avastin/; Editorial, The Avastin Mugging, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704271804575405203894857436.html.
294 This attack line against health care reform exploded into the public discourse in August
2009, when Alaska governor (and former vice-presidential candidate) Sarah Palin posted comments
on her Facebook page warning readers-with no apparent justification-that under the president's
health care plans, they would have to "stand in front of Obama's 'death panel' so his bureaucrats
[could] decide, based on a subjective judgment of their 'level of productivity in society,' whether
they [were] worthy of health care." Ceci Connolly, Seniors Remain Wary of Health-Care Reform,
WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/
08/AR2009080802367.html. The "death panel" charge was leveled at the FDA recently, in
November 2011, when the agency withdrew its provisional approval of the drug Avastin for the
treatment of breast cancer. Conservative websites and editorial pages erupted with outrage at the
notion that the government would remove a treatment option from victims of the disease. See, e.g.,
Editorial, The Avastin Denial, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl0001424052970203611404577046133283707236.html; Milton R. Wolf, The FDA's One-Man
Death Panel, WASH. TIMES, June 21, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/
jun/21/the-fdas-one-man-death-panel/. The author has on file comments posted on various media
websites on November 18, 2011, the day the FDA announced its final decision. The FDA's
withdrawal of Avastin's "accelerated approval" for breast cancer did not remove the drug from the
market, because it is still approved for other cancers, and doctors remain free to prescribe it to
breast cancer sufferers. The real fear of opponents of the FDA decision, therefore, is that
government insurance (and, in response, private insurance plans) will stop reimbursing for this use.
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Importantly, however, as is the case with alternative remedies, few advocates
for freedom of therapeutic choice within orthodox medicine have achieved
victory in court. The most successful arguments have been advanced through
vehicles such as testimony at legislative hearings and FDA advisory committee
meetings, organized letter-writing drives, administrative filings, press campaigns,
and public demonstrations. Although these campaigns have not been as explicitly
constitutional as their nineteenth-century counterparts, recent trends indicate an
increasing embrace of constitutional rhetoric.
It remains to be seen, however, whether current promoters of freedom of
therapeutic choice within orthodox medicine will construct a persuasive multi-
pronged argument similar to the Thomsonians' rhetoric. Not all people arguing
for freer access to unapproved pharmaceutical products embrace economic
libertarianism and broader hostility to government. To the contrary, some disease
advocacy groups value the FDA's role as a gatekeeper ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness, even as they exhort the agency to open the gate a bit wider, and
virtually all groups lobby energetically for more government funding of medical
research. In the 1980s, for example, the leaders of a demonstration at FDA
headquarters by AIDS activists demanding earlier and greater access to
experimental drugs warned participants to "be careful to keep their agenda ...
from being confused with the Bush/Wall Street Journal/Heritage Foundation
agenda of sweeping drug industry deregulation." 29 5
Furthermore, contemporary arguments for liberty within orthodox medicine
rarely invoke the freedom of inquiry strand of medical freedom. Since the middle
of the twentieth century, the gold standard for establishing medical effectiveness
has been the meticulously structured, highly restricted, placebo-controlled
clinical study. In this regime, the unregulated use of unproven remedies is
perceived as undermining, rather than advancing, the pursuit of truth. Finally,
while freedom of conscience continues to be an important theme for religious
groups like Christian Scientists resisting the use of orthodox treatments, freedom
of conscience arguments are largely absent from the rhetoric of activists urging
freedom of patient choice within the field of regular medicine. This secular tone
may dominate because modern scientific medicine, with its materialist and
empirical underpinnings, has a tenuous connection to spiritual matters.
It is thus possible that the calls for freedom of therapeutic choice within
orthodox medicine will never assume the features of a broad popular
candidate Mitt Romney declared in a debate with President Barack Obama that he opposed
"Obamacare" (the Affordable Care Act) in part because "it puts in place an unelected board that's
going to tell people, ultimately, what kind of treatments they can have." Romney was referring to
Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), which in fact is forbidden by the statute from
making any recommendation "to ration health care" or "otherwise restrict benefits or modify
eligibility." See Reality Check: Looking at Candidates' Claims, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 4, 2012, at C20.
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constitutionalist movement. But this result is not foreordained. Perhaps bodily
freedon arguments alone can drive such a movement. Or maybe conditions will
change so as to enhance the modem relevance of one or more of the other
traditional strands of medical freedom. Or perhaps new strands will form. In any
event, the stubborn American insistence on freedom of therapeutic choice is
something policymakers inevitably will have to wrestle with as they struggle to
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